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THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE
CAROLYN CACCESE*
The call for reform of campaign finance law has resonated in
politics from both candidates and the general public alike.'
Recent electoral spending has reached shocking proportions and
fueled a movement for change.2 After heated debates in both
Houses of Congress,3 the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (The
Act)4 was passed, amending the Federal Election Campaign Act,5
*J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law.
1 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,439 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Engel) (arguing "[t]he American people demand campaign finance reform"); see also
Michael Marcucci, Speech or Not: Applying Election Law Strict Scrutiny to
Campaign Finance Regulations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 173, 205 (2000) (noting both
political parties have labeled campaign finance an important issue). See generally
Eric L. Richards, The Emergence of Covert Speech and its Implications for First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 561 (2001) (mentioning cry for
reform stems from all aspects of society).
2 See Federal Elections Committee, FEC Reports on Congressional Financial
Activity For 2000, (May 15, 2001), at http://www.fec.gov/press/051501congfinact/051
501congfinact.html (last visited July 13, 2003) (noting that Congressional
candidates in the 2000 elections reportedly spent $1.006 billion which was the
highest figure ever recorded); see also Jim Drinkard, Spending on TV Political Ads
Nears $1B, an All-Time High, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2002, at Al (indicating that
spending on television advertisements for the 2002 elections is expected to reach
new high). See generally Donald J. Simon, The Current Debate Over Soft Money:
Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft Money System, 24 J.
LEGIS. 167, 176 (1998) (noting recent increase in soft money contributions).
3 See Jeremy Monteiro, Comment, A Profile in Courage: The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the First Amendment, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 83,
118-119 (2002) (noting that in the House of Representatives Speaker Dennis
Hastert proposed rules to control the debate of the bill that some believed were
designed to kill support for the bill and a seventeen-hour debate resulted in its
passage); see also 147 CONG. REC. S3233,3235-3236 (daily ed. April 2, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Kohl) (explaining quality of debate produced strong support by
both parties for the bill). See generally Robert F. Bauer, Election Law Symposium:
Going Nowhere, Slowly: The Long Struggle Over Campaign Finance Reform and
Some Attempts at Explanation and Alternatives, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 741, 741
(indicating that campaign reform debate never ends decisively).
4 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
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and in March of 2002 President Bush signed the
bill into law.6 A challenge to the constitutionality of the Act was
quickly mounted.7 In assessing this claim, the historical
background of campaign finance legislation and judicial
decisions on the topic must be fully understood.
In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act in order to effectively deal with increasing election costs and
provide for more effective disclosure of funds.8 At the time it was
hailed as a major reform to the electoral process, but soon
thereafter, the Watergate scandal was exposed and numerous
problematic campaign practices were uncovered.9 In response to
5 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
6 See Russell L. Smith & Barbara A. Block, New Campaign Finance Law Bans
"Soft Money" but Increases Individual Federal Contribution Limits, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., INC., June 2002, at 19 (explaining that President Bush signed the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act on March 27, 2002 without show or ceremony); see
also Legislation Improves Campaign Finance System, Bush Says; Senate approves
House-passed Reform Bill FED. INFO. AND NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Mar. 21, 2002
(noting the President who has expressed his concern over the constitutionality of
the Act and proposed that the most effective method of campaign regulation is
disclosure). See generally David S. Karp, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the Regulation
of Issue Advocacy by Tax-exempt Organizations Through the Internal Revenue Code,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805, 1839 (2002) (indicating that President Bush signed the Act
into law shortly after passed).
7 See Amy Kort, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Litigation, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION REC., May 2002, at 4 (discussing that lawsuit filed by both National
Rifle Association and Senator Mitch McConnell the day President Bush signed bill);
see also A Newsletter on American Politics, FED. INFO. AND NEWS DISPATCH, INC.,
Mar. 27, 2002 (noting discontent with Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act by a few
Senators, including Mitch McConnell). See generally Trevor Potter & Kirk L.
Jowers, The Frequently Mischaracterized Impact of the Courts on the FEC and
Campaign Finance Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 874 (2002) (indicating that the
Act should withstand any constitutional challenge).
8 See Daniel M. Yarmish, Note, The Constitutional Basis for A Ban on Soft
Money, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1260 (1998) (describing origin of campaign
finance legislation); see also John Anderson, Election Campaign Finance Reform, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 205, 211 (1994) (indicating the Act's purpose was to avoid
allowing public officers to change their viewpoints to that of their benefactor). See
generally Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First
Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71, 74 (1999) (explaining that the Act avoids using
money for improper purposes).
9 See Bauer, supra note 3, at 745 (noting corruption associated with Watergate
fueled Congressional action on campaign finance); see also Todd Paulson & David
Schultz, Bucking Buckley: Voter Attitudes, Tobacco Money, and Campaign
Contribution Corruption in Minnesota Politics, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 449,
452 (1998) (arguing there is universal agreement that 1974 amendments were
passed because of Watergate). See generally Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience
and the First Amendment, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1348 (1994) (discussing
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this corruption, Congress amended the Federal Election
Campaign Act in 1974, extending its application to contributions
and expenditures in connection with campaigns as well as
tougher disclosure laws and a provision providing public funding
for presidential campaigns.O The amendments also created the
Federal Election Commission, an agency charged with the duty
of promulgating regulations as well as interpreting and
implementing federal campaign finance law." The amendments
drew much criticism and a challenge to the requirements soon
followed.12
This note will examine the history of campaign finance
jurisprudence. Part one will describe the principles the Court
has developed in dealing with campaign finance legislation in
conjunction with First Amendment principles. It will analyze
the effects of the judicial doctrine and the problems that have
arisen. Part two will discuss the provisions of the Bipartisan
Reform Act of 2002. It will discuss in detail the controversial
Watergate as reason behind the 1974 amendments).
10 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. F.E.C., 518 U.S. 604, 609
(1996) (finding purpose of the amendments of the Act was to remedy actual or the
appearance of corruption in elections and equalize participation); see also Kenneth
G. Potter, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Political Speech of the
Common Voter is Promoted Through Campaign Finance Reform, 11 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 151, 155 (2002) (noting origin of FEC). See generally Christopher P. Banks
& John C. Green, The Legal and Political Implications of Buckley v. Valeo (1976),
33 AKRON L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (indicating that amendments were motivated by
Watergate Scandal).
11 See Amanda S. LaForge, The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political, and Legal
Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 351, 353 (1996) (stating FEC is an independent agency charged
with implementing campaign finance laws); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
140-41 (1976) (noting that Federal Election Commission's rulemaking and advisory
opinions are actually legislative and judicial in nature). See generally John M.
Volkman, Testing New Forms of River Basin Governance: Implication of the Seattle
Master Builders Case, 17 ENVTL. L. 835, 851 (1987) (explaining that Federal Election
Commission are officers of the United States for purposes of the Appointment
Clause).
12 See George F. Fraley, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The
Administration's Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1251 (1996) (noting a challenge brought the day after the
amendments were put into operation by Senator Buckley); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Preserving An Independent Judiciary: The Need For Contribution
And Expenditure Limits In Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 133, 139 n.30
(1998) (explaining Buckley and the background of the amendments). See generally
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Focus on: Restoring Faith in Government: Equal
Protection and the Wealthy Primary, 11 YALE L. & POLY REV. 273, 316 (1993)
(noting challenges to FECA provisions on First Amendment grounds).
2003]
226 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:1
ban on soft money as well as the limits placed on campaign
advertisements and issue advocacy. Part three will assess the
constitutionality of the Act. It will argue that soft money
regulation is within the established judicial principles. The
issue advocacy limitations, although not firmly entrenched in
court decisions, should also be found constitutional. Finally,
part four will evaluate the likelihood of a new judicial doctrine
on campaign finance legislation and argue that rejection of the
Buckley doctrine is necessary in light of contemporary political
realities.
I. THE REALM OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Origin of Campaign Finance Principles
The First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
rights of free speech and association without interference from
the government. 13 The Amendment's guarantee has been deemed
especially important in the area of political expression and
debate.14 Such rights have even been considered at the heart of
the amendment's protection.15 Because of the need for an
educated electorate in our system of government, political
discussions have received great protection in order to ensure
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (1791) (forbidding Congress from passing
legislation "abridging the freedom of speech" or "the right of the people to peacefully
assemble"); see also Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics:
Time for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 542 (1995) (noting the Supreme
Court has held that freedom of association exists within the Amendment's
guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and petition). See generally Steven Chaffee &
Stacey Frank, How Americans Get Political Information: Print Versus Broadcast
News, 546 ANNALS 48, 49 (1996) (explaining that First Amendment guarantees
were formed out of faith in the people).
14 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (interpreting the First
Amendment to "protect the free discussion of governmental affairs"); see also Robert
N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 68 B.U. L. REV. 131,
174 (1989) (noting that restrictions on political activity must withstand "exacting
scrutiny"). See generally Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates
of Campaign Finance Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 795 (2001) (indicating the
importance of political expression).
15 See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (stressing
"constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office"); see also Nicholson v. Judicial Comm'n, 50
N.Y.2d 597, 607 (1980) (stating "the rights of political expression and association
are at the heart of the First Amendment."). See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Free
Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 365 (2001) (arguing the ability
to comment on matters of public concern is important to the First Amendment).
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that elections take place free from governmental intervention.16
Associational rights insure that groups may congregate to
discuss their views in a meaningful discussion.17 This
constitutional right to associate protects the activities of political
parties and other political organizations.18 The Supreme Court
has interpreted campaign donations and candidate spending to
be within this protection. 19 These rights of freedom of speech and
association, however, are not absolute and government
restrictions can be upheld in certain situations.20
16 See Arthur N. Eisenberg, Campaign Finance Reform, and the Virtues of
Moderation, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 141, 141 (2000) (arguing that democracy
mandates an informed citizenry); see also Robert Post, Regulating Speech Under the
First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1841 (1999) (noting tension between First
Amendment limitations and unrestricted speech). See generally Jules B. Gerard,
Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in Honor of Daniel R. Mandelker:
Part III: Zoning Aesthetics: Chapter 5: The Takings Clause and Signs: Election
Signs and Time Limits, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'f 379, 390 (2000) (indicating that
speech concerning elections is at the top of First Amendment protections).
17 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) (noting
associational rights protect against encroachments on individual liberties and on
fundamental rights); see also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)
(emphasizing "[t]he right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom"). See generally NAACP v. Ala.,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding the right to associate protects exchange of ideas
and fundamental concepts of liberty).
18 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (affirming the
great protection political parties receive under the First Amendment's guarantee of
associational rights); see also Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986)
(stressing associational rights protect the actions of political parties). See generally
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (stating political party activity comes
within associational rights of the First Amendment).
19 See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)
(stating "independent campaign expenditures constitute 'political expression' at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms"'); see also John
Fry, Note, The Citizens "Clean" Elections Act: A Cure as Bad as the Disease, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1373, 1384 (1999) (arguing that forbidding campaign spending is
unconstitutional). See generally Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre
of Fund-raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First
Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1314 (1994) (indicating that
spending limits restrict speech).
20 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (arguing "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute in any event."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (emphasizing the need for the government to prove a
compelling state interest in order to regulate within the First Amendment sphere of
protection); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (noting even though
governmental purpose may be legitimate it "cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties").
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Campaign finance legislation infringes upon the rights of
freedom of association and speech, but not all legislation on the
matter has been invalidated.21 In determining whether campaign
finance legislation unduly infringes upon First Amendment
rights, the courts have applied "exacting scrutiny."22 This
scrutiny level has been applied to speech issues in order to give
the government the necessary freedom to regulate fields of
speech or expression that would otherwise be protected.23 But
the Court has repeatedly viewed governmental interference in
this area as a threat to constitutional guarantees. 24 Using this
level of scrutiny, a law will be upheld "only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest."25
In the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo,26 the Supreme Court
applied exacting scrutiny to amendments of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), upholding contribution limitation
21 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (upholding $1,000 contribution
limits for individuals); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385
(2000) (noting contribution limits are constitutionally permissible). See generally
Blasi, supra note 19, at 1325 (arguing that spending limits may advance First
Amendment rights).
22 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (stating exacting scrutiny is required for First
Amendment analysis); see also Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1197 (2001) (noting that exacting scrutiny applies to
campaign finance legislation). See generally Buckley v. Amn. Constitutional Law
Found., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999) (applying exacting scrutiny to ballot initiatives
approved by voters on the election process); Potter, supra note 10, at 160 (arguing
that exacting scrutiny is essentially strict scrutiny).
23 See Denver Area Educ. Telecommission Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
741 (asserting scrutiny level leaves government possibility of essential regulation);
see also Potter, supra note 8, at 78 (noting that test requires the state to have a
substantial state interest). See generally Eric L. Richards, Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee: Implications for
Parties, Corporate Political Dialogue, and Campaign Finance Reform, 40 AM. BUS.
L.J. 83, 92-93 (2002) (explaining the connection between money and expression does
not introduce a nonspeech element).
24 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (describing
risks inherent in governmental regulation); Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A
Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L. REV. 7, 8 (1999) (quoting McIntyre
standard); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing First
Amendment protections of political speech).
25 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (announcing the appropriate test for
evaluating legislation); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)
(describing standard government must meet is the showing of a compelling interest
narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177
(1983) (stating restrictions will be upheld "only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest").
26 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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provisions while invalidating expenditure limitations.27 The
challengers of the amendments argued that the amendment
provisions unconstitutionally restricted the rights of freedom of
speech and association.28 In examining the law, the Court found
the restrictions it imposed inhibited the voice of the people and
decreased the reach of political campaigns.29 Therefore, it
determined that the act hampered political speech and
associational rights.30
In its analysis, the Court distinguished between
contribution limits and expenditure limits. Contribution limits
capped the amount a person may donate to a candidate to $1,000
in an election year.31 Expenditure limits restricted the amount a
person may spend on communications encouraging the election
or defeat of a particular candidate to $1,000 in an election year.32
27 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59 (holding that "limitations on contributions"
are "constitutionally valid" but the First Amendment requires the invalidation of
the Act's expenditure limitations); see also Jason P. Conti, Book Review, The Money
Chase: How Proposed Changes to Campaign Finance Laws Could Impact Female
Candidates, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 108-09 (2001) (reviewing ELEANOR
CLIFT AND TOM BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE LAST GLASS
CEILING) (stating Buckley held that contribution limits were permissible but
expenditure limits violated constitutional principles). See generally Gora, supra note
24, at 15 (setting forth the FECA including provisions limiting candidate
contribution and expenditure limitations).
28 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (summarizing challenger's argument as
"contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political speech and that the
Act's limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment liberty that are
both gross and direct"); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 18 (noting opposers like the
ACLU argued reforms would suppress political advocacy). See generally Richards,
supra note 1, at 565 (citing argument that First Amendment freedoms have been
directly challenged).
29 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17 (stating the Act controls "the voices of people and
interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the overall scope of federal
election campaigns"). See generally Gora, supra note 24, at 18 (describing the
Buckley decision as "a landmark of political freedom"); Richards, supra note 1, at
559 (calling the Buckley decision a "watershed" decision).
30 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 (concluding both contribution and expenditure
limitations are greater than traditional elections clause limitations); see also Gora,
supra note 24, at 18-19 (tracing Court's rationale that limits on political speech
threatened First Amendment freedoms); Richards, supra note 1, at 565-66
(clarifying the Court's position that in part the FECA intended to restrict
expression).
31 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (stating contribution limitation); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7
(summarizing statutory provisions); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 24 (stating the
FECA contribution limit of $1000).
32 See 2 U.S.C. § 608 (e) (1) (repealed) (noting contribution limit); Buckley, 424
U.S. at 39 (quoting statutory limitation); Richards, supra note 1, at 560 (stating the
FECA individual expenditure limit of $1000).
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The Court found the expenditure limits to infringe on freedom of
speech and association rights in a more substantial manner than
the contribution limitations.33 It reasoned that the contribution
limitation only forced candidates to raise money from an
extended constituency and did not constrain the total amount a
candidate could raise.34 The expenditure limitation, however,
was held to be a much more substantial burden on First
Amendment Rights, because it limited the opportunity of people
and political associations to express their views on a particular
candidate.35
After noting that these provisions of the act interfered with
constitutional rights, the court analyzed each provision
separately.36 The applicable standard announced stated, "[e]ven
a 'significant interference' with protected rights of political
association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms."37
With regard to the contribution limits, the Court found the
government interest in avoiding corruption or the appearance of
corruption sufficiently important to warrant such legislation
because of the need for public confidence in the governmental
33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 (holding "[a]lthough the Act's contribution and
expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its
expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected
political freedoms"); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 23 (noting the Court's relative
favor of contribution limits and disfavor of expenditure limits); Richards, supra note
1, at 560 (declaring that the Court drew a clear distinction between expenditure and
contribution limits).
34 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22 (finding candidates would have to raise
money from more sources, but there was no limitation on the amount of money they
could raise); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 23 (detailing the Court's rationale in
allowing contribution limits to stand); Richards, supra note 1, at 566 (interpreting
the Court's holding with respect to its allowance of contribution limitations).
35 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (declaring the expenditure limitation "precludes
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents"); see also
Gora, supra note 24, at 20 (relaying the Court's rationale that government cannot
exercise power over the quantity and range of political debate); Richards, supra note
1, at 571 (stating that expenditure limits were found unconstitutional).
36 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24 (noting that contribution and expenditure limits
both impinged on First Amendment rights, but expenditure limits constituted a
greater burden). See generally Richards, supra note 1, at 565-72 (outlining the
Court's decision in Buckley); Kristen Kay Sheils, Landell Bodes Well for Campaign
Finance Reform: A Compelling Case for Limiting Campaign Expenditures, 26 VT. L.
REV. 471, 478-80 (2002) (summarizing the Buckley decision).
37 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-30.
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system and the amount limitation did not have to perfectly
advance this important goal.38 However, with respect to the
expenditure limits the Court found the same justification of
corruption or appearance of corruption inadequate and that the
means of the Act were not narrowly tailored to prevent such
corruption. 39 In rejecting the corruption purpose, the Court
determined that the possibility of corruption was not as strong
concerning this type of expenditure and other provisions of the
act more effectively dealt with such concerns.40 The Court also
rejected the government's argument that the expenditure
distinction was necessary in order to level the playing field for
candidates,41 finding that restrictions on speech of some cannot
be implemented in order to increase the level of speech of
others.42
While examining the expenditure limitation, the Court
confronted the challenger's argument that this provision was
38 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (noting Watergate scandal and possibility of quid
pro quo corruption); see also Richards, supra note 1, at 567 (explaining that
necessary to any government success was a showing of sufficient governmental
importance, among those named is prevention of corruption); Sheils, supra note 36,
at 479 (reporting the Court's decision to accept the government's corruption
argument with respect to contributions).
39 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (rejecting assertion that expenditure limits are
subject to same evil as contribution limits); see also Richards, supra note 1, at 570
(underscoring Court's decision that expenditure limits did not lessen corruption);
Sheils, supra note 36, at 479 (recounting Court's decision not to accept corruption
argument with respect to expenditures).
40 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47 (arguing other provisions of the Act
effectively deal with possible corruption in this area). See generally Bauer, supra
note 3, at 757 (discussing strengths and weaknesses of the Court's corruption
holding); Gora, supra note 24, at 23-25 (contrasting the Court's decision and the
opposing position with respect to the corruption issue).
41 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56 (arguing support for a particular candidate will
vary, thus contributions will also vary); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 21
(maintaining that the Court focused on securing the widest dissemination of ideas,
rather than equal dissemination among different candidates). See generally
Richards, supra note 1, at 567 (noting the government's goal to achieve a level
playing field for all candidates).
42 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 (noting "[i]n the free society ordained by our
Constitution is it not the government but the people-individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political committees-who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political
campaign"); see also Richards, supra note 1, at 569 (pointing out the portion of this
argument concerning incumbent advantage was rejected by the Court). But see
Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance
Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 785-86 (2001) (arguing five reasons for the
constitutionality of campaign finance reform, including an equality among
individuals rationale).
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unconstitutionally vague. 43 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that the provision referred to expenditures "advocating
the election or defeat of a candidate."44 In reaching this decision,
the Court distinguished between issue advocacy, which
encourages activism and support on a particular issue, and
express advocacy, which encourages voters to choose or reject
specific candidates on Election Day.45 It recognized that in
certain instances, the difference between both types of advocacy
may be slight:
For the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
candidates may often dissolve in practical application.
Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to
public issues involving legislative proposals and
governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign
on the basis of their positions on various public issues,
but campaigns themselves generate issues of public
interest.46
These categories of advocacy have remained a strong force in
politics today.47 Buckley made it abundantly clear that
restrictions on express advocacy are permissible, while
restrictions on communications that do not promote the election
or defeat of a candidate may not be regulated.48 The courts still
43 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40 (describing challenger's vagueness argument);
see also Richards, supra note 1, at 569-70 (providing insight into Court's narrowing
interpretation so as to avoid a finding of vagueness). See generally Jan Witold
Baran, National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment: Compelled Disclosure of Independent Political Speech and
Constitutional Limitations, 35 IND. L. REV. 769, 772-73 (2001/2002) (examining
Court's understanding of term expenditures).
44 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
45 See id. at 42 (noting that discussion of issues and candidates are not
identical); see also Gora, supra note 24, at 29 (explaining that the Court's express
advocacy doctrine worked to protect issue advocacy from controls). See generally,
Bauer, supra note 3, at 751-52 (discussing Court's reaction that there exists speech
alternatives by which to demonstrate candidate support).
46 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
47 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (confirming
contribution and expenditure distinction as set out in Buckley); see also FEC v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (reaffirming Buckley
holding). See generally Karp, supra note 6, at 1805 (stating that since Buckley,
political candidates have identified themselves with particular issues).
48 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (stating that the government's interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, was not a sufficient
justification for 2 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1)'s cap on independent expenditures); see also
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distinguishes today between express advocacy and impermissible
restrictions on issue advocacy.49
The dissenting opinions seem to have anticipated many of
the problems that have arisen since the Court decided Buckley.
Chief Justice Burger questioned the viability and effectiveness of
the remaining sections of the statute, since the majority opinion
invalidated expenditure limitations while upholding contribution
limitations.50 Justice White viewed both limitations as
constitutional and argued that it was necessary to uphold
expenditure limitations in order to prevent circumvention of the
act.51 He also argued that without expenditure limits the cost of
campaigns would continue to increase.52 Justice Marshall viewed
Gora, supra note 24, at 22 (1999) (discussing standard set out in Buckley); Karp,
supra note 6, at 1805 (referring to the Buckley distinction between express advocacy
and discussion of issues).
49 See Citizens for Responsible Gov't v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (2000)
(noting importance of the categories of advocacy); see also James Bopp, Jr. and
Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs no Reform: Protecting Liberty
From Campaign Finance "Reformers", 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 791 (2002) (stating
that lower federal and state courts still adhere to Buckley's express advocacy test).
See generally Andrew C. Geddis, Democratic Visions and Third-Party Independent
Expenditures: A Comparative View, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5 (2001) (stating the
Buckley holding has resulted in a "complicated and unstable framework" where
courts must perform the categorizational task to label political speech as "express
advocacy" or "issue advocacy").
50 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235-36 (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting that
remaining sections of the statute may prove ineffective because of Court's holding);
see also Ronald A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics: Governance Models and
Campaign Fina.ace Regulation, 6 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (noting that
Justice Thomas subsequently criticized the divergent treatment that expenditures
and contributions receive and declared it goes against Supreme Court precedent);
Richard Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The Thing That
Wouldn't Leave", 17 CONST. COMMENT 483, 483 (2000) (observing that since
Buckley, members of the Supreme Court have criticized its decision to hold
campaign contribution limits and campaign expenditure limits to different
standards).
51 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing Congress is
in a better position to judge campaign necessities and the Court should accept its
wisdom); see also Stephanie Pestorich Manson, When Money Talks: Reconciling
Buckley, The First Amendment, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1109, 1125 (2001) (stating
that in cases subsequent to Buckley, Justice White consistently disagreed with the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding campaign finance laws). See
generally Sheils, supra note 36, at 501-02 (examining Justice White's opinion).
52 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 264 (White, J., dissenting) (noting campaign
spending will continually increase and candidates will feel pressured to raise more
and more money); Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 375-76
(1995) (observing that since Buckley congressional campaign expenses have
increased at a much faster rate than inflation); Marty Jezer et al., A Proposal for
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a limitation on the contributions of candidates to their own
campaigns as necessary to achieve a level playing field among
the candidates.53 His concern was that wealthy candidates would
face significantly decreased barriers in the election process
because they would not be reliant on private contributions and
also focused on negative public reaction to such candidates.54
Many of these concerns and arguments have become a reality in
today's political process.
B. Effects of Buckley and the Rise of Modern Problems
Since the court's holding in Buckley, the
contribution/expenditure distinction has proliferated.55 Courts
have consistently invalidated expenditure limitations while
Democratically Financed Congressional Elections, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 336
(1993) (observing that in 1974 the combined cost of all House and Senate campaign
was $77 million and rose to $678 million in 1992).
53 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (mentioning that
limiting candidates from spending their own money would decrease barriers to
entering political elections); see also Molly Peterson, Reexamining Compelling
Interests and Radical State Campaign Finance Reforms: So Goes the Nation?, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 433 (1998) (stating that Justice Marshall desired to
equalize the political playing field). See generally Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on
Federal Income Taxation and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 n.47
(2002) (stating that Buckley raises the old constitutional debate between liberty and
equality).
54 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (remarking the honor
of the election process may be undermined by wealthy candidates spending their
own fortune to essential buy an election); see also William P. Marshall, The Last
Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 349 (2000)
(observing that Buckley has received harsh criticism for underestimating the
influence wealth has in election campaigns and rejecting interests of equality in
campaigning as a sufficient justification expenditure limitations). See generally
James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 439,
465 (1996) (stating that the decision in Buckley gave wealthy political candidates a
"perpetual advantage" because they can spend as much of their money as they want
while less wealthy candidates are forbidden from obtaining a comparable amount
from a single source).
55 See Douglas J. Feichtner, Campaign Finance Reform-Whether Money Talks
Depends on Who is Talking: FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 789, 795 (2002) (mentioning since Buckley courts
have consistently classified regulation as either contribution or expenditure
limitation); see also Sharon Wheeler, Money in Politics: Reforming Alabama's
Campaign Finance and Ethics Laws, 45 ALA. L. REV. 675, 683 (1994) (noting
contribution limits have been regularly upheld while expenditure limits are
questionable); David C. Clifton, Note, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee: A Vote for Campaign Finance Reform?, 53 MERCER L. REV.
911, 917 (2002) (observing that the contribution/expenditure differentiation is
maintained today).
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upholding contribution limits.56 In Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC,57 the Court held the FECA Party
Expenditure Limitation was unconstitutional and could not be
applied to political party expenditures that were not coordinated
with a specific candidate.58 Relying on the Buckley classification,
the Court found this type of provision was intended to regulate
what Buckley had labeled an independent expenditure, which
cannot be constitutionally regulated.59 Similarly, in FEC v.
National Conservative Political Action Committee,60 the Court
struck down a limit on independent expenditures made by
political committees because it attempted to impose limits on
expenditures that Buckley had deemed impermissible.61
In contrast, provisions that limit contributions to political
candidates have been steadily upheld.62 The Court upheld
56 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000) (confirming
contribution and expenditure distinction as set out in Buckley); see also Todd R.
Overman, Note, Shame on You: Campaign Finance Reform Through Social Norms,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1272 (2002) (stating that the contribution/expenditure
difference is still relied upon today). But see Richards, supra note 23, at 91 (noticing
that some courts have not accepted a "rigid application" of the distinction between
contribution and expenditure delineated in Buckley).
57 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
58 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 613
(1996) (holding the party expenditure provision violated First Amendment
principles); see also Burt Neuborne, Selected Supreme Court Cases 2001 Term
(Through April 30), 684 PLILIT 125, 137 (2001) (stating that the court in Colorado
Republican affirmed the expenditure/contribution distinction). See generally
Amanda G. Altman, Party Poopers: The Supreme Court Overlooks the Party in
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1001, 1022 (2002) (observing that the Buckley
distinction between contributions and expenditures to individuals does not
contemplate limits to political parties).
59 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. at 614-15
(finding the expenditure was not an indirect contribution but an independent
expenditure); see also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1745
(2001) (stating that Colorado Republican upheld the central holding of Buckley by
rejecting limits on political party expenditures). See generally Simmons, supra note
53, at 8 (declaring that Buckley has shaped the contemporary development of
organizing campaigns).
60 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
61 See Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497 (reaffirming
Buckley holding); see also Richards supra note 23, at 118 (2002) (stating the decision
allowed corporations, by acting through their political action committees, to funnel
an unlimited amount of money to their candidates). See generally Briffault, supra
note 59, at 1741 (stating that Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. followed
Buckley in focusing on the quid pro quo: dollars for political favors).
62 See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley,
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limitations on contributions made to multi-candidate political
action committees by individuals in California Medical
Association v. FEC.63 There the court determined that the
Buckley analysis applied, and if an individual could be
constitutionally limited to the amount of money he or she could
give to a candidate, they could be constitutionally limited in the
amount given to a political action committee.64 Likewise, in FEC
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,65 the
Court upheld a limitation on political parties' coordinate
expenditures, those spent in conjunction with a candidate,
because of the potential to effectively destroy the constitutionally
permissible contribution limitations in place.66 The Court
analyzed the provision under the contribution limits scrutiny set
out in Buckley, because such a provision was easily likened to a
contribution directly to a candidate.67
454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (J. Marshall concurring) (noting that distinction between
contributions and expenditures is longstanding); see also Wheeler, supra note 55, at
683 (declaring that contribution limits have been upheld); Clifton, supra note 55, at
917 (stating contribution and expenditure differences are still upheld today).
63 See Cal. Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197 (1981) (emphasizing
contributions limits are constitutionally permissible under the Buckley framework);
see also Clifton, supra note 55, at 918 (stating that the contribution given to the
multi-candidate political committees in Cal. Medical Ass'n could permissibly be
limited without violating the First Amendment); Scott Shuchart, Seeking Coherence
in Doctrines of Part Election Expenditures, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 515, 518-19
(2001) (stating Cal. Medical Ass'n held that Congress can permissibly place
restrictions on contributions to these associations).
64 See Cal. Medical Ass'n., 453 U.S. at 198 (stating the contribution limitations
can be applied to multicandidate political committees in order to prevent
circumvention of the policies of the Act); see also Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A
Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21
CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 385 (1992) (stating that Cal. Medical Ass'n reaffirmed Buckley
in distinguishing between regulations of expenditures and contributions); Clifton,
supra note 55, at 918 (stating that the court reiterated Buckley's holding).
65 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
66 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 464 (analogizing
political party coordinate expenditures to contribution limits); see also Richards,
supra note 23, at 83-84 (stating that Colorado II upheld legislation that limits how
much political parties can spend in conjunction with a candidate for federal office).
See generally Monteiro, supra note 3, at 107 (observing that in this decision, the
Court recognized the political realities and took an incremental step in recognizing
that contribution and expenditure of money is conduct, rather than speech).
67 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 456 (applying test
"whether the restriction is 'closely drawn' to match what we have recognized as the
'sufficiently important' government interest in combating political corruption"); see
also Monteiro, supra note 3, at 116-17 (stating that Colorado II put to rest some
speculation that the Buckley framework was unstable). See generally Altman, supra
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This judicial doctrine has created the framework within
which campaign finance legislation may be passed.68 The
Buckley doctrine limited the type of regulation Congress may
pass in order to deal with the growing problem of the ever-
increasing cost of conducting a campaign.69 Such constraints
upon Congress have often been blamed for the lack of effective
campaign finance changes since the 1974 amendments.70
The decision has not gone without criticism. Many have
argued that its framework impermissibly restrains free speech
and the Court's analysis damaged firmly established First
Amendment principles.71 Some have labeled it one of the worst
decisions of this century. 72 Others have argued that money
note 58, at 1018 (examining the tension between Buckley and Colorado I1).
68 See Potter, supra note 10, at 167-68 (arguing Buckley and Nixon affirm First
Amendment principles that limit Congressional action); see also Richards, supra
note 23, at 90-91 (stating that proponents of campaign finance reform eagerly
awaited the Colorado II decision); Monteiro, supra note 3, at 107 (observing that
those in favor of campaign finance reform were relieved after the Court's decision in
Colorado 11).
69 See David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line
between Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. &
POLITICS 33, 35 (1998) (arguing that Buckley distinction hampers legislative efforts
even though the general public desires meaningful reform legislation); see also
Briffault, supra note 59, at 1759 (positing that Buckley has allowed politicians and
organizations to disturb legislative efforts to restrict campaign funding); Richard
Briffault, Symposium: Law and Political Parties: The Political Parties and
Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 634 (2000) ("The Buckley
doctrine appears to raise serious constitutional objections to any legislative efforts
to curtail party independent spending or party issue advocacy.").
70 See Deborah E. Schneider, As Goes Maine? The 1996 Maine Clean Election
Act: Innovations and Implications for Future Campaign Finance Reforms at the
State and Federal Level, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 627, 631 (2000) (noting that
although public support of campaign finance reform is at an all-time high, Congress
has not passed meaningful legislation in over twenty years). See generally Geddis,
supra note 49, at 29-30 (outlining the reforms invoked by the 1974 amendments to
the Federal Elections Campaign Act); Paulson & Schultz, supra note 9, at 451
(offering evidence of corrupt campaign financing practices which satisfy Buckley).
71 See Banks & Green, supra note 10, at 1 (noting some have stated that
Buckley protected neither First Amendment principles nor campaign laws); see also
Richards, supra note 1, at 585 (reasoning that non-recognition of political equality
as a sufficient governmental interest to overcome burdens on free speech was a
specific error in Buckley). But see Gora, supra note 24, at 30 (1999) (arguing that
Buckley reaffirmed the bedrock First Amendment freedom of public discussion of
public issues).
72 See Gora, supra note 24, at 7 (stating academics have rated Buckley in the
top ten worst decisions of the century); see also John C. Bonifaz et al., Challenging
Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 58 (1999) (noting that
scholars have criticized the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley). But see
Colloquia, Campaign Finance Reform: Law and Politics: Constitutional
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should not be considered within the realm of speech and that
even more restrictions on campaigns should be implemented.73
Still others have approved of the decision, stating that it has
effectively intermingled First Amendment principles and the
need for campaign finance regulation.74
The most problematic outcome of the distinction between
contributions and expenditures has been the ability to sidestep
the regulations.75 In a fairly recent decision, Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC,76 Justice Kennedy's dissent coined
the term "covert speech."77 Justice Kennedy argued that the
Buckley distinction created an even greater vice than the one it
intended to correct and severely damaged First Amendment
principles previously established by the Court.78 Justice Kennedy
Implications of Campaign Finance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 161, 167 (1994)
[hereinafter Constitutional Implications] (suggesting that the possibility of
overturning Buckley is unreal).
73 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing "[m]oney is property; it is not speech"); see also Monteiro,
supra note 3, at 110 (discussing common criticism of the Buckley decision is
classification of political money as speech). But see Constitutional Implications,
supra note 72, at 167-68 (suggesting "it is impossible to allow political speech to be
unrestrained if the purse strings that allow it to reach its audience are severed.").
74 See Gora, supra note 24, at 7 (hailing Buckley decision as protective of First
Amendment Rights and gives power to influence elections to the people); see also
Blasi, supra note 19, at 1288 n.24 ( "Buckley's conclusion that certain campaign
finance reforms that cannot be instituted directly by means of prohibitions can be
achieved indirectly by means of financial incentives."). But see Richard L. Hansen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44 n.202 (1996) (arguing that
Buckley must be overruled).
75 See Richards, supra note 1, at 561 (discussing the ability of parties,
candidates, and interest groups to avoid contribution limitation); see also Bradley A.
Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: The General Landscape: The Siren's Song:
Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3
(1997) (positing that campaign finance reforms may never be effectuated with each
major party having sufficient Senate votes). See generally Lowenstein, supra note
64, at 302 (suggesting that there are unforeseeable ways that corruption may occur
in campaign financing).
76 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
77 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Buckley
created another category of speech which protects efforts to avoid contribution
limits); see also Richards, supra note 1, at 586 (2001) (claiming that Buckley and its
progeny have given rise to an increase in use of soft money in campaign elections);
Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply And Demand Of Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L.REV. 524, 542 (2000) (explaining Justice Kennedy's feeling that Buckley
pushed spending into issue advocacy which is covert speech).
78 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406-08 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court's
analysis created protections for concealed speech while limiting more legitimate
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argued that while restrictions are placed on the contributions
that can be given to a candidate, damaging issue advocacy
advertisements and soft money go completely unregulated.79 He
places the blame for such an effect squarely on the Court and
argued if Congress created the problematic campaign finance
legislation, the Court could more effectively deal with it;
however, "its unhappy origins are in our earlier decree in
Buckley, which by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting
contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting expenditures)
created a misshapen system, one which distorts the meaning of
speech."o The final effect of this distinction is avoidance of the
actual law and deceitful campaign practices that further corrupt
in the electoral system,8 1 whereas Buckley believed such
spending was not subject to that evil.82
public participation); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue
Advocacy," and Buckley v. Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 487 UCLA L. REV.
285, 294-95 (2000) (noting that Buckley did not define the category of speech that is
unambiguously campaign related); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth:
Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance
Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2001)
(mentioning that sham ads which resulted from Buckley may have been
unintentional by the Court).
79 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing soft money and
issue advocacy remain unregulated because of the Buckley decision); see also Kara
Baker, Comment, Is Justice for Sale in Ohio? An Examination of Ohio Judicial
Elections and Suggestions for Reform Focusing on the 2000 Race for the Ohio
Supreme Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 159, 172 n.102 (2001) ("Because donors can
contribute to issue advocacy groups in unregulated amounts, the possibility for
corruption may be greater than for express advocacy."). But see Lillian R. BeVier,
The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and Constitutional Analysis, 85
VA. L. REV. 1761, 1781 (1999) (suggesting that an anti-corruption motivation is
unavailable to endorse limitations on issue advocacy).
80 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Gail Kijak Martens,
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: Further Dissension Over The Federal
Election Campaign Act, 50 CATH. U.L. REV. 819, 822 (2001) (arguing that Buckley
rewrote the campaign finance laws); Simon, supra note 2, at 170 (blaming the court
for ineffective campaign finance laws that existed after Buckley).
81 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Boyd) (arguing that diminished participation in elections occurred because of the
corruption of money in politics); see also Ronald M. Levin, Dedication: Fighting the
Appearance of Corruption, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 171, 178 (2001) (suggesting that
the Court's reliance on public perception is misplaced); Baker, supra note 79, at 177
(discussing limitations on government regulations on issue advocacy subsequent to
Buckley).
82 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (holding that expenditures
independent from candidates were not subject to quid pro quo corruption because
they are unaffiliated with the candidate). See generally FEC v. Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying the standard set forth in
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The evil of covert speech as discussed by Justice Kennedy
refers to the proliferation of the distinction between express
advocacy and issue advocacy. Since issue advocacy is not
considered part of the federal election process, it is not subject to
the limitations imposed by FECA.83 Individuals and groups are
free to run ads that will affect federal elections as long as they
steer clear of the "magic words" announced in Buckley.84 These
ads usually take the form of attacks on current politicians in an
attempt to influence the electorate's decision making.85 As long
as the ad does not specifically declare, "vote for" or "defeat,"86
groups are free to spend unregulated money to manipulate the
outcome of federal elections.87
Buckley); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996)
(explaining Buckley as applied to independent party expenditures).
83 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir.
2002) (stressing Buckley's holding that the government cannot regulate issue
advocacy); see also Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 362 F.3d 379, 391
(4th Cir. 2001) (noting that there is a sharp distinction between express advocacy
and issue advocacy); Clifton v. FEC, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining
that the FECA "stops short of prohibiting issue advocacy").
84 See Kirk L. Jowers, Issue Advocacy: If It Cannot Be Regulated When It Is
Least Valuable, It Cannot Be Regulated When it is Most Valuable, 50 CATH. U.L.
REV. 65, 72-73 (2000) (noting courts require magic words in order to fund an ad is
express advocacy and can therefore be subject to regulation); Potter & Jowers, supra
note 7, at 845 (arguing that absence of magic words in advertisement leaves courts
wary of regulation because of fears of limiting speech). But see Glenn J. Moramarco,
Beyond "Magic Words": Using Self Disclosure to Regulate Electioneering, 49 CATH.
U.L. REV. 107, 118 (1999) (arguing that Buckley did not limit the finding of express
advocacy to the magic words but that the court looked to the message itself in order
to determine its character and purpose).
85 See Baker, supra note 79, at 180 (suggesting that groups may publish
derogatory advertisements under the pretext of issue advocacy); see also Potter,
supra note 8, at 83 (discussing examples of derogatory advertisements used without
magic words). But see Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts
on Campaign Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 CONN. L. REV. 831, 838
(1998) (arguing that issue advocacy in its present form only exists because of the
current campaign finance laws).
86 See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (holding that
the Constitution requires the invocation of such words in order for it to be
considered express advocacy); see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990) (explaining that language requirements burden speech and
require a compelling governmental interest to be overcome); Becker v. FEC, 112 F.
Supp. 2d 172, 181 (D. Mass. 2000), affd 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000) (reviewing the
meaning of "expenditure" with respect to the Act's legislative history).
87 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 90 (arguing there is very little regulation on
issue advocacy); see also Bopp & Colson, supra note 49, at 786 (2002) (maintaining
that advertisements aimed at issue advocacy need strict regulation); Gora, supra
note 24, at 28 (claiming that regulations on issue advocacy are unprecedented and
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Given the Court's strict restrictions on Congress passing
effective campaign finance reform, the legislation currently in
place has not effectively dealt with campaign costs and spending.
Parties and candidates have been able to circumvent current law
and take advantage of unintended loopholes in the law.88
Corporations and labor unions have been pouring money into
political parties to influence elections, since they are barred from
directly contributing to a candidate's campaign.89 Wealthy
individuals have followed this path by donating unlimited and
unrestricted amounts of money into the political parties.90 These
practices have effectively circumvented the intended aims of the
Federal Election Campaign Act.91
C. Soft Money
Soft money refers to the contributions made by unions,
corporations, and wealthy individuals to political parties, which
are unregulated by the FECA.92 These contributions allow
unconstitutional).
88 See Conti, supra note 27, at 112 (reviewing ELEANOR CLIFT AND TOM
BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE LAST GLASS CEILING) (noting both
parties use soft money to run issue advocacy ads that affect federal elections). See
generally Geddis, supra note 49, at 147-48 (discussing various loopholes that arise
under analogous campaign finance legislation in the United Kingdom). But see
Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 154 (proposing that loopholes will always remain as
long as financial interests are at stake).
89 See Richards, supra note 1, at 561 (mentioning that third parties have
avoided limitations on contributions). See generally La Forge, supra note 11
(reviewing the Tillman Act as the predecessor of the FECA). But see Paulson &
Schultz, supra note 9, at 488-89 (noting that Minnesota law prohibits corporations
from providing political candidates with contributions).
90 See Richards, supra note 1, at 561 (arguing that unregulated money reaches
the candidates); see also Conti, supra note 88, at 127-28 (arguing that unregulated
contributions by wealthy individuals provides the basis for corrupt activities);
Simmons, supra note 53, at 88 (reviewing the concept of "party building" and its
relation to the FECA).
91 See Charles E.M. Kolb & Christopher Dreibelbis, Campaign Finance Reform:
A Business Perspective, 50 CATH. U.L. REV. 87, 95 (2000) (arguing unions and
corporations evade contribution limitations by using soft money donations and avoid
the law prohibiting such groups from donating to political candidates); Scott E.
Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Coordinate Expenditure Limits: Can They Be
Saved?, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 133, 164 (1999) (declaring allowance of soft money in
the federal election system leaves provisions of the law irrelevant); Fred
Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring
the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1145 (1998) (arguing soft
law has undermined purpose of federal law on elections).
92 See Conti, supra note 27, at 127 (describing soft money as unregulated
money that individuals and groups donate to political parties); Kolb & Dreibelbis,
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parties to spend excessive amounts of money, draped in the
name of party building, to indirectly advocate the election or
defeat of political candidates.93 This money enables parties to
run issue advocacy ads, which have a great impact on political
elections.94 These ads often have the effect of confusing the
voters and it is usually impossible to determine who is actually
sponsoring such communications.95
The origin of soft money in politics did not occur because of
the Buckley decision. The 1979 Congressional amendments to
FECA in conjunction with FEC regulations have permitted the
explosion of soft money. 96 An FEC advisory opinion in 1978
permitted parties to use funds previously banned from federal
elections for activities that benefited both state and federal
supra note 91, at 109 n.13 (defining soft money as unregulated money that
individuals, groups, and private corporations can donate to political parties); Mark
Fineman, Political Financing's New State, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 1 (defining
soft money as unregulated money unions and companies contribute to political
parties that will affect elections).
93 See Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 767 (2000) (defining soft money
and its effects on political debate); see also Simon, supra note 2, at 176-77 (arguing
that soft law contributions have a negative affect on political discourse). See
generally Briffault, supra note 69, at 628 (defining soft money as falling outside
boundaries under federal regulation but affecting elections).
94 See Briffault, supra note 69, at 631 (arguing that parties have found soft
money beneficial to run issue advocacy ads that affect elections); see also Gora supra
note 24, at 25 (arguing that soft money donations and issue advocacy have been
foremost in reform discussions). See generally Richards, supra note 23, 123 n.27
(explaining that soft money used to pay for issue advertisements may have both
direct and indirect effects on elections).
95 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Lucas) (remarking that issue ads inundate voters days before the election and no
one is held accountable for these deceptive and sometimes blatantly false
advertisements); see also Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1760-61 (1999) (noting that issue ads
often confuse voters in figuring out whether politicians or interest groups sponsor
such ads). See generally Jowers, supra note 84, at 66 (explaining that issue ads are
viewed by critics as meant to influence elections and not to discuss issues).
96 See Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Law and Political
Parties: Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598, 600
(2000) (stating the 1979 amendments created an avenue for parties and individuals
to avoid contribution limits); Conti, supra note 27, at 127 (arguing "[s]oft money
officially arose out of the 1979 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act");
Robert Paul Meier, Comment, The Darker Side of Nonprofits: When Charities and
Social Welfare Become Political Slush Funds, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1008 n.152
(1999) (stating 1979 amendments to Federal Election Campaign Act created "soft
money loophole").
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candidates for office.97 The money spent by the parties was to be
allocated between hard money spent on federal elections and soft
money, which could be permissibly spent on state candidates.98
After intense pressure from lobbyists, Congress amended FECA
to allow the state and local parties to spend infinite resources on
certain specified activities.99 These activities consisted of voter
registration drives, get out the vote drives, and the creation of
campaign materials such as bumper stickers, handbills, and
yard signs.100 Although all money spent in conjuncture with a
federal election was supposed to be regulated by the FECA, soft
money does in fact manipulate electoral outcomes.lOl
The amount of soft money spent in federal elections has
grown dramatically in recent years.10 2 In the 1995-1996 election
97 See Federal Elections Commission Advisory Opinion 1978-10, available at
http:/Iherndon3.sdrdc.comlao/ao/780010.html (last visited July 13, 2003) (allowing
state parties to spend soft money on certain activities not proscribed for federal
campaigns); see also Donald J. Simon, Soft Money: The "End Run" Around Federal
Campaign Finance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 76-77 (1998) (quoting
original Advisory Opinion); Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for
Reform, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (1998) (explaining how 1978 FEC
Advisory Opinion allowed state parties to raise money for nonfederal races).
98 See 147 CONG. REC. S3233,3250-51 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Thompson) (noting that portion of soft money was permissibly spent on federal
elections); see also Conti, supra note 27, at 128 (noting that soft money can be spent
in conjunction with hard money on issue advocacy). See generally Monteiro, supra
note 3, at 91-92 (discussing how soft money can be used for "voter mobilization and
registration activities").
99 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2000) (eliminating state party building activities
from federal limitations); see also Overman, supra note 56, at 1264 (noting
codification of 1978 FEC Advisory Opinion). See generally Yarmish, supra note 8, at
1260 (discussing effect of 1979 Congressional amendments).
100 See Briffault, supra note 69, at 626 (noting activities on which state parties
may spend soft money); Anthony Corrado, Campaign Finance Reform: The General
Landscape: Giving, Spending, and "Soft Money," 6 J. L. & POL'Y 45, 46-47 (1997)
(outlining activities soft money may used for); Monteiro, supra note 3, at 92 (listing
specific activities paid for by soft money by parties and committees).
101 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, Jr., supra note 96, at 598 (arguing the
channeling of soft money through parties allows soft money to influence federal
elections); see also Briffault, supra note 69, at 628 (stating that soft money funding
affects federal elections); Simon, supra note 97, at 75 (arguing soft money is meant
to affect political campaigns).
102 See Conti, supra note 27, at 111 (reviewing ELEANOR CLIFT AND TOM
BRAZAITIS, MADAM PRESIDENT: SHATTERING THE LAST GLASS CEILING) (noting the
large increase and affect soft money has had in recent elections); see also Paul
Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards,
96 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 1009 (2002) (discussing increase in soft money raised and
spent since 1992); John Lewis, Editorial, Don't Let Money Rule, WASH. POST, July
10, 2001, at A21 (noting 50 percent increase in soft money spent since 1996).
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cycle, Democrats doubled the amount of soft money spent to $121
million while Republicans tripled the amount to $149 million
from the previous election cycle.103 The presidential election of
1996 is often cited as the advent of the substantially large soft
money infusion into politics.104 However, in the 2000 federal
election, a staggering $495.1 million in soft money was spent by
the parties, with the Democrats spending $245.2 million and the
Republicans spending $249.9 million.105
The amount of soft money spent in federal elections shows
the current law has not worked. The general public has become
very disillusioned by a political process they view as catering to
the rich, while ignoring the poor.10 6 Electoral participation has
reached an alarming low, where half of the American people do
not even bother to make it to the polls on Election Day.107 The
103 See 147 CONG. REC. S3233,3248 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Levin) (noting soft money spent in the 1996 elections); 148 CONG. REC. H270,270
(daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Lucas) (remarking on the large amount
of soft money spent in the 1996 election cycle). See generally Yarmish, supra note 8,
at 1268-69 (observing increased soft money spending by political parties).
104 See Bradley Smith, The Current Debate over Soft Money: Soft Money, Hard
Realities: The Constitutional Prohibitions on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179,
182 (1998) (noting "widespread use of soft money" was used for the first time by
political parties to finance issue advertisements during 1996 presidential
campaign); see also Corrado, supra note 100, at 51 (noting soft money raised in the
1996 election was "three times that raised in 1992"); Soft Money, supra note 97, at
1332-33 (explaining how the 1996 campaign "witnessed the unprecedented use of
soft money").
105 Monteiro, supra note 3, at 92-3 (2002) (quoting FEC figures of soft money
expenditures); Douglas Waller, Looking for Loopholes Twenty-eight Years after the
last campaign-finance reforms, new rules look set to take effect. Will they be tough
enough to clean up the game?, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, at 42 (noting "$500 million" of
soft money was raised and spent in the 2000 federal elections); Press Release,
Federal Election Commission, FEC Reports Increase In Party Fundraising for 2000
(May 15, 2001), available at http://fecwebl.fec.gov/press/051501partyfund/051501
partyfund.html (last visited March 2, 2003).
106 See 148 CONG. REC. S2096,2099 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (arguing "[i]f in the minds of Americans, our public citizens at large, in whom
we must maintain the confidence of an electoral democratic process, our campaign
financing system is so corrupted by large contributions, that is a stark reality with
which we have to contend."); Bonifaz et al., supra note 72, at 48 (quoting poll figures
that show Americans believe campaign contributions sway the decision making
process of elected officials); see e.g., Sean T. McLaughlin, Pledge Our Grievance to
the Flag: Could McCain-Feingold Also Help Bring Young People Back to Politics?, 27
J. LEGIS. 493, 496-97 (2001) (noting young voters do not vote because they lack
resources for their viewpoints to be considered as opposed to other constituencies
with funds).
107 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,414 (2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (noting that
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disturbingly low participation in our electoral process signifies
extreme dissatisfaction with the current political arena. 08
Attempts to deal with the soft money problem began in the
late 90's with numerous bills being presented in the House and
the Senate for vote.1 09 Senator John McCain became associated
with campaign reform in his unsuccessful presidential bid in
2000.110 On April 2, 2001 the Senate passed the McCain-Feingold
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act."' On February 15, 2002, the
House of Representatives passed the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan
only 51 percent of eligible voters participated in the 2000 presidential election
because of disinterest stemming from money in politics); see also Voter Registration
and Turnout 2000, FEC website, available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/2000turnout/
reg&toOO.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (noting 75% of eligible voters are
registered, and of that percent 67.5% voted, meaning only 51.3% of the total
national voting age population participated in the 2000 elections). See generally
Edward Walsh, Election Turnout Rose Slightly, to 39.3%, GOP Mobilization
Credited; Participation was Down in Some Democratic Areas, WASH. POST, Nov. 8,
2002, at A10 (noting "slight increase" in voter turnout from prior midterm election
from 37.6% to 39.4%).
108 See Christopher W. Carmichael, Proposals for Reforming the American
Electoral System After the 2000 Presidential Election: Universal Voter Registration,
Mandatory Voting, and Negative Balloting, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 255, 256
(2002) (discussing lower voter turnout, approximately at half of eligible voters, as an
indication of dissatisfaction with government); Kolb & Driebelbis, supra note 91, at
87 (arguing that even though there is no direct link between voter participation and
loathing of campaign funding, it can be inferred from recent data); see also Paul M.
Schwartz, Vote.com and Internet Politics: A Comment on Dick Morris's Version of
Internet Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1071, 1079 (2001) (mentioning that
although candidate spending on ads reached new highs in 2000, participation
decreased from prior 1992 presidential elections).
109 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1997, S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997)
(killed in 1998 by filibuster); Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 96, at 601
(mentioning campaign reform bills were passed in the House but killed in the
Senate); Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1269-1270 (discussing House and Senate
campaign reform bills that did not pass in late 1990s).
110 See David Dutwin, What Could Voters Learn From the 2000 Primaries?:
Knowledge in the 2000 Primary Elections, 572 ANNALS 17, 22 (2000) (stating ban on
all soft money was at the core of Senator McCain's presidential bid); Monteiro,
supra note 3, at 83 (commenting that McCain's presidential run brought campaign
finance reform into public debate); Overman, supra note 56, at 1267 (noting
campaign finance reform was an issue of McCain's unsuccessful run for office).
111 See 147 CONG. REC. S3233,3258 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of
Acting President pro tempore) (announcing the vote as 59 yeas, 41 nays); Michael
Kelly, McCain-Feingold's Fatal Flaws, Editorial, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2001, at A27
(noting passage of McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill); Editorial, The
Senate's Next Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at A18 (noting McCain-Feingold Act
passed in the Senate by large margin).
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Reform Act, an almost identical bill.112 Finally, on March 27,
2002, President Bush signed the law into effect.113
II. BIPARTISAN REFORM ACT OF 2002
The Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002,114 is a major change to
the current scheme of campaign finance laws.115 It can be
regarded as the most meaningful campaign finance reform since
the 1974 amendments were enacted.116 However, it has been
already challenged by numerous groups, much like the 1974
amendments, as an unconstitutional restriction on associational
rights and political speech.117
The purpose of the Act has been interpreted as intending to
112 See 148 CONG. REC. D 97, (Feb. 13, 2002) (noting passage of Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act by a vote of 240-189); Thomas Frank, But Will It Fly In The
Senate? Key Foe of Campaign Finance Bill Vows a Lengthy Battle, NEWSDAY, Feb.
15, 2002, at A04 (mentioning House passed Shays-Meehan Act, which is almost
identical to McCain-Feingold); Charles Lane, Editorial, Court Tests Likely for
Shays-Meehan; 'Issue Ad' Rules Viewed as Vulnerable, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002,
at A04 (noting Shays-Meehan Act was passed by House and discussing possible
challenges to bill).
113 See Elisabeth Bulimer with Philip Enson, President Signs Bill on
Campaign Gifts; Begins Money Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002 (noting quick
signing of bill by President Bush); Mary McGrory, McCain-Feingold Follies, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28, 2002, at A29 (mentioning President Bush signed bill quietly); Smith
& Block, supra note 6 (noting President Bush signed the bill into law without
ceremony).
114 Pub. L. 107-155.
115 See Mark Hansen, Costly Speech: Failure to Follow Legal Requirements for
Political Contributions Can Mean Serious Trouble, 88 A.B.A.J. 36 (2002) (stating
campaign finance laws will be drastically changed with onset of Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act). But see, E.J. Dionne Jr., Fear of McCain -Feingold, WASH.
POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at A25 (arguing that law simply builds on past campaign laws);
John Samples & Patrick Basham, Meet the New Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2002, at A27 (arguing that new law will have loopholes and people will find them,
therefore the new law does nothing but maintain the status quo, if not make the
system worse).
116 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 123 (noting this is most important legislative
change in thirty years); Seth P. Waxman, Free Speech and Campaign Finance
Reform Don't Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at A21 (remarking that the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act is attempting to re-establish honesty in political
system). But see Samples & Basham, supra, note 115 (arguing that while it is a
major change, it may not be for the better).
117 See Kort, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing that lawsuit filed by both the
National Rifle Association and Senator Mitch McConnell the day President Bush
signed the bill); A Newsletter on American Politics, supra note 7 (noting discontent
with Bipartisan Campaign Reform act of a few Senators, led by Mitch McConnell);
Charles Fried, A Campaign Law that Curbs More Than Contributions, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2002, at A17 (noting that the law was challenged as unconstitutional).
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reinstate honesty and respectability in the political process.118
Congressman Meehan, a sponsor of the Act in the House of
Representatives, argued the soft money influx in politics has
kept Congress from passing effective legislation to protect
American working families.119 As noted in legislative debates,
recent corporate scandals, including Enron, acted as a
motivating force behind the passage of the Act.120
The major provisions of the Act increased the amount an
individual may contribute to a candidate for federal office to
$2,000 per electionl2l and increased the amount individuals may
donate to national political parties from $20,000 to $25,000 per
118 See Dionne, supra note 115, at A25 (quoting form Republican whip Alan
Simpson as saying "Too often, member's first thought is not what is right or what
they believe, but how it will affect their fundraising"); Neely Tucker, Campaign Law
Case Brings Debate, Crowds; McCain-Feingold Bill Called Threat to Free Speech -
and Key to Honest Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at A04 (quoting Roger M.
Witten, lawyer for bill sponsor Senator John McCain, as saying "This law is
designed to repair a thoroughly broken campaign finance system..."); Waxman,
supra note 116, at A21 (arguing the purpose of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act "seeks to restore integrity to this system" of politics).
119 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,439 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Meehan) (discussing influence from soft money has not permitted passage of bills
concerning prescription drugs, worker's rights, and other such concerns). See also
Dionee, supra note 115, at A25 (quoting former Republican Senator Warren
Rudman as saying, "I know firsthand and from working with colleagues just how
beholden elected officials and their parties can become to those who contribute to
their campaigns and their parties coffers" this, he added, "distorts the legislative
process"); Neely Tucker, States Back Campaign Finance Law, Court Motion
Supports McCain-Feingold Act, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at A23 (quoting Iowa
Attorney General Thomas J. Miller as saying "the accumulated experience of
members of Congress, reinforced by empirical evidence, is that the dominance of
money in politics seriously threatens the public's faith in the legitimacy of
government and in the elections that choose whom shall govern").
120 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,439 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Engel) (remarking that general public is annoyed with corporate scandal and that
incident caused many to support campaign reform legislation); 148 CONG. REC.
H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Lucas) (observing Enron
scandal should be used as a lesson for Congress to "avoid even the appearance of
impropriety" and support reform); see also Waxman, supra note 116, at A21 (stating
that the uncovering of Enron scandal displays corruption and the idea that money
buys access to elected officials).
121 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307
(a)(1), 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (noting individual donations to candidate has increased);
148 CONG. REC. S2096,2142 (daily ed. March 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain)
(noting increase from $1,000 to $2,000 showed Congress' view that any contribution
exceeding that amount may have corruptive influence); Matthew Hidman, How Web
Will Change Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at A23 (noting that the Act
doubles the amount individuals may give to $2000).
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year.122 The limit on overall donations to federal candidates,
political action committees, and parties was raised to $37,500.123
Additionally, these limits have also been indexed to increase
with inflation.124
A further major provision of the Act is its ban on unlimited
and unrestricted use of soft money. The Act provides "[a]
national committee of a political party may not solicit, receive, or
direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of
funds or any thing of value, or spend funds that are not subject
to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of
this Act."125 This restriction is an attempt to close the present
loophole that allows soft money to be spent in federal
elections. 126
The Act also limits the definition of independent
expenditure in order to include more activity within this
provision. The revised definition classifies an independent
expenditure as a communication "expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not
made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or
suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political
committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its
agents."127 The difference in the definition is that it now includes
suggestions or requests by political party committees and their
agents. The effect is that not only can the candidates not solicit
122 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, § 307 (a) (2) (increasing personal
donations to national political parties); see also Richards, supra note 23, at 92
(noting prior limits on federal campaign spending).
123 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 307 (b) (A) (amending 2 U.S.C. §
441(a)) (describing "individual aggregate limit"); see Audra L. Wassom, Campaign
Finance Legislation: McCain-Feingold/Shays Meehan - The Political Equality
Rationale and Beyond, 55 SMU L. REV. 1781, 1792 (Fall 2002) (noting the increase
in aggregate annual contribution to $37,000).
124 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, § 307 (d) (reciting method of
calculating increases in contribution limits).
125 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, § 323 (a) (1) (disallowing money
to be spent in federal elections).
126 See Hansen, supra note 115 (mentioning outcry that soft money "violates
the spirit if not the letter" of the Act); Fried, supra note 117, at A17 (noting that the
Act attempts to close present loopholes in the campaign financing system); Tucker,
supra, note 118, at A04 (noting the Justice Department's argument that the law
was designed to plug the loopholes of the current system that have been thoroughly
exploited by current politicians).
127 2 U.S.C. § 431 (17) (a) and (b) (limiting the definition of independent
expenditure).
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or suggest that independent expenditures be made on their
behalf, but party committees many not seek out potential
supporters of a political candidate to suggest they run an
advertisement to back a particular candidate.128
The most controversial part of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act that deals with issue advocacy forbids unions and
labor organizations from running "electioneering
communications."129 Electioneering communications are defined
as communications that refer to a specific candidate within sixty
days of a general election or thirty days before a primary
election.130 Under this definition, the attack ads that are usually
seen frequently as the election approaches cannot be funded by
soft money groups but must be paid for with limited hard money
from the political parties.131
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002
A. Soft Money Ban
There are many arguments against the constitutionality of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Challengers claim that an
all-encompassing ban on soft money is not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.32 Additionally it is
128 See Richards, supra, note 23 (noting that Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
prohibits party soft money fundraisers); Monteiro, supra note 3, at 121 (arguing the
Act increases regulation of advertisements).
129 Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002, § 203 (amends 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2)). See
generally Fried, supra note 117 (noting that groups like the Sierra Club and the
National Rifle Association are hurt by Act's prohibitions against running adds
within specified times of the election). But see Samples & Basham, supra note 115
(arguing that new law may help these groups raise money).
130 Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002, § 201 (3)(A) (amends 2 U.S.C. § 434)
(defining electioneering communication as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication which refers to a clearly identifiable candidate for Federal office"
made within 30 days of a general election or 30 days before a primary).
131 See Samples & Basham, supra note 115, at A27 (noting the rules for
running advertisements near election day for non-party groups); Tucker, supra note
118 (noting that law limits issue adds that non party groups may run close to
election day); George F. Will, Sham Concern for Corruption, WASH. POST, May 16,
2002, at A25 (noting provision that prevents non-party groups from running any
advertisement that refers to an actual candidate within 30 days of a primary and 60
days of a general election).
132 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 641
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (stating "broad prophylactic caps on both
spending and giving in the political process.. .are unconstitutional"); Yarmish, supra
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argued that this provision is direct regulation of core political
speech, which is unconstitutional. 133 Challengers have also
claimed that such regulation is an intolerable burden on the
ability of political parties to promote political ideas, within their
freedom of political speech.134 However, using the framework
established in Buckley, a ban on soft money clearly is
constitutional and does not unduly burden First Amendment
Rights. 135
The starting point of the constitutional analysis is
considering the treatment of soft money under the Buckley
framework. The soft money ban in the Act deals with the supply
of money, and not the spending of money.136 Since the ban deals
with limiting the amount an individual or corporation can
contribute to political parties, it is not as restrictive of First
Amendment rights as an expenditure limitation.37 Contribution
note 8, at 1279 (quoting Thomas' argument); Charles Lane, As Justices Reconvene,
Key Issues are Awaiting,- Court Might Review McCain-Feingold, Affirmative Action,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2002, at A08 (noting that the bill's primary detractor, Sen.
Mitch McConnell, believes the bill to violate the provisions of the First
Amendment).
133 See Kort, supra note 7, at 4 (describing arguments that have been mounted
against the Act); see also Dionne supra note 115, at A25 (noting opponents
argument that preventing groups from running advertisements is a violation of the
First Amendment's protection of political speech); Tucker, supra note 118 (stating
argument that law amounts to an abridgement of First Amendment rights).
134 See Kort, supra note 7, at 4 (describing arguments that have been mounted
against the Act); Tucker, supra note 118 (noting that Kenneth Starr argued that the
law "tramples First Amendment rights"); see also Hansen, supra note 115
(suggesting arguments challengers to Act will make).
135 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 122 (remarking that soft money ban fits
within Buckley framework); Tucker, supra, note 118 (stating that Former Solicitor
General Seth P. Waxman argued before the District Court that no part of the Act
violated the provisions of the First Amendment); see also Tucker, supra note 119, at
A23 (noting that nineteen states joined in arguing that Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act was constitutional because the current system posed a large threat to
our democratic system).
136 See Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1275 (arguing that it is well settled that
Congress may regulate sources of funding); see also Dionne, supra note 115, at A25
(noting that the Supreme Court has held that regulation of sources of money is
constitutional). But see Smith, supra note 104, at 180 (intimating that most bans on
soft money are unconstitutional).
137 See Joe W. Brown & Andrew Spalding, Grass Roots Democracy, or Free
Speech Abridged?, 10 NEV. LAW. 8 (2002) (discussing how limits on contributions do
not violate the First Amendment); Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner:
Reforming the Judicial Selection Process in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1287
n.145 (2001) (arguing that McCain-Feingold soft money ban should be found
constitutional because it limits contributions and not expenditures); Karp, supra
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limitations, in contrast, only place a "marginal restriction" upon
the contributor. Therefore, the soft money ban is subject to
somewhat less scrutiny according to the Buckley analysis.138
Although the First Amendment is meant to protect
legitimate discussion of political ideas, this right has never been
recognized as absolute.139 Money is donated by individuals and
corporations in avoidance of other statutory provisions and then
is funneled through the parties and eventually spent in a
manner that affects an electoral outcome.140 Banning such
diluted speech has very little imposition on the rights of any.
Such watered down speech does not contribute any meaningful
public debate on the issues.141 By the time the money is spent in
a method that affects public debate, it is unclear who has
donated to support the issue advanced.142 The true purpose of
note 6, at 1821 (noting that express advocacy can be regulated under the First
Amendment).
138 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (noting how contribution
limitations are only a "marginal restriction"); Jane Conrad, Note, Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC: Campaign Contributions, Symbolic Speech and the
Appearance of Corruption, 33 AKRON L. REV. 551, 564-65 (2000) (discussing when
the intermediate level of scrutiny may be appropriate); see also Monteiro, supra note
3, at 122 (arguing Buckley stands for the proposition that contribution limitations
require a less compelling government interest than expenditure limitations).
139 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (arguing "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute in any event"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (emphasizing the need for the government to prove a
compelling state interest in order to regulate within the First Amendment sphere of
protection); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (noting even though
governmental purpose may be legitimate it "cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties").
140 See Feichtner, supra note 55, at 794 (noting current FEC policy allows
unlimited donations of soft money from unions and corporations); Richards, supra
note 23, at 88 (noting soft money comes from corporate donations and labors
unions); Richards, supra note 1, at 586 (noting unions and corporations donate large
amounts of soft money to the parties).
141 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 647
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting influence of one person is "diffused" in a
political party); Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 144 (arguing citizens are disenchanted
with political discourse that depends on attack ads and does not effectively discuss
important issues). But see Jeremy Marsh, Missouri's Sacrificial Lamb: Political
Party Contributions and Campaign Finance Reform in Missouri Republican Party v.
Lamb, 45 ST. Louis L. J. 925, 954 (2001) (noting a political party's contribution is
viewed as an expression).
142 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 408 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing issue advocacy has led to an "indirect system of accountability
that is confusing, if not dispiriting, to the voter"); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 518 U.S. at 647 (noting there is no danger that one individual would be able
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the ad is to influence voters, and there is usually no opportunity
to disclose the source of the funds used to produce the
advertisement.143 The ad will often distort a candidate's position
in order to inflame the voting public.44 Soft Money has simply
developed as way to contravene other restrictive statutory
provisions in an underhanded manner.145
Associational rights are also not unduly restricted by the
Act's contribution limits. Buckley held that associational rights
"enable like-minded persons to pool their resources in
furtherance of common political goals."146 The soft money ban
does nothing to prevent people from donating to political parties
or participating in other activities that show their support and
dedication to the ideals advanced.147 The ban also only places a
slight burden on the associational rights of parties. They are
free to associate with candidates and partisan supporters-but
they now must do it within the framework of the Federal
Election Campaign Act.148
to bribe a candidate); see also Martens, supra note 80, at 853 n.241 (2001) (quoting
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Nixon).
143 See Becky Cain, Sham Issues Ads: Solutions to a Clear Record of Abuse, 10
STAN. L. & POLY REV. 71, 72 (1998) (arguing "[s]ham issue advocacy provides a
useful conduit for those who want influence without leaving any fingerprints"). See
generally FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (declaring a newspaper
article to be express advocacy of a candidate by a private citizen); FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life Inc., 769 F.2d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting how group was involved
with expressly advocating).
144 See Mass. Citizens for Life, 769 F.2d at 20 (noting display of candidates
pictures is advocating); Blasi, supra note 19, at 1299; Cain, supra note 143, at 72
(remarking a study performed showed that marginal number of the issue advocacy
ads actually represented candidate's positions).
145 See Briffault, supra note 95, at 1752 (noting that soft money is not covered
by federal regulation); Richards, supra note 1, at 561 (discussing the ability of
parties, candidates, and interest groups to avoid contribution limitation); see also
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting how candidates have
developed ways to get around contribution limits).
146 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976); see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,
57 (1973) (noting "[t]he right to associate with the political party of one's choice is
an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom).
147 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (arguing that even though contribution limit is
in place, people are still at liberty to join associations or the campaign activities of a
candidate in order to show their support and exercise their constitutional rights of
freedom of association); see also Richards, supra note 1, at 585-86 (noting the
problems associated with unregulated soft money). But see Gora, supra note 24, at
22-23 (noting campaign finance proposals cut at the very heart of the First
Amendment).
148 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Boyd) (blaming soft money for the crumbling of the national political parties and
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Keeping in mind the restrictions imposed, it must be
determined whether the "interference with protected rights of
political association may be sustained" by a government
demonstration of "a sufficiently important interest" developed in
a manner "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
associational freedoms."149 In Buckley, the Court held the
avoidance of corruption or appearance of corruption is a
significantly compelling governmental interest to justify
regulation on contributions.150 The existence or possibility of
quid pro quo arrangements was found to validate the
government's interest.151
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act attempts to deal with
the fact that soft money is used for a corruptive purpose.152
Scholars have noted "soft money corrupts for a simple and
obvious reason. Soft money donations are given in such huge
amounts - $50,000, $100,000, or more - that the donors typically
expect to receive something in return for any investment of this
magnitude."153 Wealthy individuals and corporations donate
arguing a soft money ban will strengthen the parties). But see Bopp & Coleson,
supra note 49, at 815 (arguing that the ban of soft money is a direct attack on the
right of association); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 91, at 1155 (hypothesizing
that a ban on soft money will violate the right of association).
149 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88 (quoting Buckley
standard); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (repeating firmly established
principle that "even though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved"); Citizens for Responsible
Gov't v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting appropriate
standard to judge campaign finance legislation).
150 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (noting that Congress has an interest in
avoiding appearance of corruption); Bonifaz et at., supra note 72, at 45 (noting the
governmental interest of preventing corruption in federal elections). But see Sorauf,
supra note 9, at 1350 (arguing the Court never clearly defined that corruption
justified restrictions).
151 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (discussing how some contributions may be
"quid pro quo" agreements; see Briffault, supra note 69, at 622 (observing that
Buckley held the only legitimate interest in campaign laws must be corruption and
quid pro quo arrangements); Potter, supra note 8, at 89 (noting the quid pro quo
agreements are a concern in elections).
152 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 96, at 601 (noting source of soft
money is frequently "corporations, associations, and individuals with strong
interests in legislative and executive decisions facing the government"); Bonifaz et
al., supra note 72, at 39 (discussing the possibility of corruption when large
contributors are financing campaigns); Paulson & Schultz, supra note 9, at 492
(noting relationship of voting habits and contributions from tobacco companies).
153 See Soft Money and the Investigation Into Campaign Finance Practices of
the 1996 Campaign Before the Senate Comm. On Gov't Affairs, 105th Congress
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excessive amounts of money in order to obtain access to political
officials.154 A prominent lobbyist noted that donations of soft
money are made in order to prevent legislative retaliation on his
interests.155 Such massive donations cannot be viewed as
anything except an attempt to sway public policy.156
Although no direct correlation can be proven between
donations to political parties and favorable policy treatment, the
inference is compelling.157 This actual corruption, or at the very
least the appearance of corruption, in our political process
justifies the imposition of a soft money ban.158
Challengers to the legislation have argued that not all soft
money donations are large donations that seek to influence the
(1997) (testimony of Common Cause, submitted by Ann McBride, and Donald J.
Simon) available at 1997 WL 592075; Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1283-84 (quoting
Senate hearings).
154 See 147 CONG. REC. S3233,3248 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Levin) (arguing "[p]eople who are in power are asking for large sums of money for
access to them"); Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 144 (arguing dependence on
fundraising provides an opportunity for "moneyed interests to buy access to
officeholders that others do not fairly enjoy"); Richards, supra note 1, at 88 (noting
that soft money comes from wealthy individuals and corporations).
155 See Burt Solomon, Forever Unclean, 32 NAT'L J. 858, 863 (2000)
(interviewing a lobbyist who candidly admitted that donations are made to protect
their interests from being damaged); see also Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra note 91, at
108 (quoting National Journal article). See generally John Warren Kindt, Gambling:
Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy: Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics, and
Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS 85, 93 (1998) (noting how lobbyists have donated large
amounts of money to protect their interests).
156 See CONG. REC. H369,443 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Lee)
(noting the influence of money in the political process from companies such as
Enron and Arthur Anderson); Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 96, at 603-04
(noting that contributors can control public policy); Ron Smith, Compelled Cost
Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary Government Voyeurism or
Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 131 (1996) (noting that new
rules are needed when lobbyists are trying to change public policy).
157 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 96, at 603-04 (noting how
contributions can change public policy); Kindt, supra note 155, at 93 (discussing
how increase in contributions led to more protective legislation for gambling
interests). See generally Kolb & Driebelbis, supra note 91, at 87 (arguing that even
though no direct link between voter participation and loathing of campaign funding
it can be inferred from recent data).
158 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,272 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Moore) (arguing American people believe that special interest money corrupts and
imposition of the soft money ban will correct this). But see Gora, supra note 24, at 36
(suggesting that public disclosure of contributions is needed, not a ban on soft
money); Smith, supra note 104, at 200 (opining that a soft money ban would be
unconstitutional).
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political process. 159 They maintain that donations to political
parties are for party building purposes and such a far-reaching
ban is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government
interest of avoiding corruption or the appearance of
corruption.160 However, this argument seems weak in light of
firmly established campaign finance principles.
The Court has previously noted that if a compelling
justification exists for governmental regulation in the campaign
finance area, the fact that the remedy has not been perfected will
not destroy the legislation. While discussing the contribution
limit in Buckley, the Court stated "Congress's failure to engage
in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation."161
Congress must be afforded some deference in its legislative
policy-making and choice behind such policy.162 In the case of the
soft money ban, Congress has noted the compelling
governmental interest in a political system free from corruptive
forces and decided that a blanket prohibition on soft money is
the only effective means of correcting the problem.163
159 See Gora, supra note 24, at 36 (noting ban of soft money is not appropriate);
Smith, supra note 104, at 200 (suggesting ban on soft money would be struck down
by the Supreme Court as too broad); Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1279 (noting that a
complete ban on all soft money may be too broad because small donations of soft
money do not present the possibility of quid pro quo corruption).
160 See Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1279 (noting that a complete ban on all soft
money may be too broad because small donations of soft money do not present the
possibility of quid pro quo corruption); see also William W. Eldridge IV, Campaign
Finance Reform Silences Protected Free Speech, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL
OPINION LETTER, June 21, 2002 (arguing that the BCRA's soft money contribution
restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and
that the BCRA may be in contention with First Amendment Rights). See generally
David M. Mason, Why Congress Can't Ban Soft Money, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., July
21, 1997 (positing that Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S.
604 (1996), indicates a showing of corruption would be difficult to satisfy).
161 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (noting that Congressional
failure to achieve an ideal balance between the harm and the remedy is not
necessary).
162 See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465
(2001) (stating "[c]ongress is entitled to its choice" when formulating campaign
finance legislation). See generally Office of Cmty. of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (explaining that courts give deference to
legislative bodies who have the authority to make laws because the courts are only
to interpret legislation, although the issue here deals with the deference given to
the FCC); Burkhart Advertising, Inc. v. Auburn, 786 F. Supp. 721, 727-28 (N.D. Ind.
1991) (stating that the court usually gives deference to lawmakers, although here it
was in reference to traffic safety and aesthetic concerns).
163 See CONG. REC. H 339,340 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Hoyer) (arguing that the passage of Shays-Meehan is "essential" to the health of our
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Opponents of the legislation argue that even if the ban is
analyzed under the less rigorous contribution limit approach, it
is still unconstitutional because in Buckley the legislation at
issue "focused precisely on the problem of large campaign
contributions"164 as opposed to the soft money ban, which is an
all-encompassing approach.165 However, this argument ignores
the fact that there are plenty of avenues still open to those who
want to donate to political campaigns. Although the mere
existence of other methods of association and speech does not
alleviate a First Amendment problem,166 in this instance the
burden on the First Amendment is slight and there are
numerous opportunities for participation and association in the
electoral process.16 7 The comprehensive ban is merely closing a
loophole that has been thoroughly abused by parties, candidates,
and individuals alike.168
democracy); Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1426 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that the states have a compelling government interest to reduce corruption).
See generally Weber v. Heaney, 793 F. Supp. 1438 (D. Minn. 1992) (giving a history
on the Campaign Reform Act, contrasting the Federal Election Campaign Act and
whether there is any preemption, as well as discussing legislative history).
164 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
165 See Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1279 (noting that a complete ban on all soft
money may be too broad because small donations of soft money do not present the
possibility of quid pro quo corruption); Guy Gugliotta, Campaign Reform: Death by
Debate?, WASH. POST, July 13, 1998, at A19 (describing the House version of the
BCRA as "all encompassing"); The Center for Responsive Politics/FEC Watch,
Forum Can't 'Undo' Past Financing, ROLL CALL, Jan. 27, 2003, Letters Section
(positing that "[t]he statute ... covers all soft-money solicitations").
166 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 755-56 (2000) (highlighting that a
"regulation [that] does not entirely foreclose any means of communication .... may
satisfy the tailoring requirement" of the First Amendment); Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 424 (1988) (stating the fact that legislation "leaves open 'more
burdensome' avenues of communication does not relieve its burden on First
Amendment expression"); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252
(1986) (rejecting FEC argument that legislation is constitutional because it leaves
open alternative methods and noting that a restriction need not be all-inclusive in
order to be substantial).
167 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (memorializing that Buckley stands for the
principle that a contribution is a political gesture and the greater the contribution
does not increase the political activism); Walsh, supra note 107, at Al (explaining
that under the Act, people may still contribute money, but it must be hard money
within the confines of the previously established contribution limits); Jonathan
Rauch, Blow It Up, NAT'L J., Mar. 29, 1997, at 604, (noting that "contributions to
candidates are capped but spending by candidates is not ([since] ... large donations
to candidates pose a clear risk of corruption, whereas candidates' own spending does
not)").
168 See Richards, supra note 1, at 561 (discussing the ability of parties,
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In light of the Court's decision in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC,169 challengers may argue that
since there can be no limitations on the party's independent
expenditures, there can be no limitations on the source of funds
for those expenditures.170 In Colorado Republican, the Court
invalidated a provision that limited the expenditures of political
parties, which were uncoordinated with a candidate as a
violation of First Amendment rights.171 However, this argument
ignores the fact that the ban on soft money does not limit the
amount of money a party can spend independent of its
candidates and only regulates the source of contributions.172 The
Court in Colorado Republican noted the Buckley distinction
between contribution limits and expenditure limits.173 Since the
candidates, and interest groups to avoid contribution limitation); James K.
Robinson and Stephen Chippendale, Jail Time May Encourage Many to Heed
Campaign Gift Law, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 11, 2003, at Vol. 2, No. 11
(indicating that a significant part of the BCRA focuses on the closure of the "soft-
money loophole"); Richard L. Hasen, Time Running Out For High Court to Hear
McCain-Feingold, ROLL CALL, Feb. 6, 2003 (highlighting that "supporters claim the
law closes loopholes that have allowed corporations and unions to make unlimited
"soft money" campaign contributions and "issue advocacy" expenditures").
169 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
170 See Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1287 (noting possible argument by
challengers based on Colorado Republican decision); Deirdre Davidson, McConnell
Case: Lawyers Jockey for Edge, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at 09 (stating that
"[o]pponents of the law mounted a twofold attack in their 353-page brief-a legal
argument about why the law violates the Constitution, existing laws, and Supreme
Court precedent, and a practical argument about the detrimental impact of the law
on the practice of politics"); Eldridge, supra note 160 (inferring that "since the
money is donated to a group instead of directly to a candidate, the idea that the
money is given as a quid pro quo is weakened").
171 Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. at 608 (holding
"the First Amendment prohibits the application of this provision to the kind of
expenditure at issue here"); see Mason, supra note 160, (explaining that "hard
money" are "contributions made directly to candidates by individuals and political
action committees"); Edward Zuckerman, To Regulate 'Leadership PACs', POL. FIN.
NEWSL., Feb. 2003 ("treating the leadership PACs of federal candidates as separate
from and unrelated to the candidate's authorized committees has ignored reality").
172 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155 § 323 (a)(1),
116 Stat. 81 (2002) (prohibiting contributions and similar donations that are not
regulated by FECA); Nancy Ives, McCain, Feingold, Cochran Introduce Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2001, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS, Jan. 22,
2001, Press Release (noting that soft money contributions will be prohibited and
that there is no limit on contributions to political parties from corporations, unions,
and wealthy individuals); Mason, supra note 160 (detailing how soft money
contributions may be regulated by Congress under free speech parameters, and that
contributions to a political party, pursuant to Colo. Republican, cannot be regulated
by Congress).
173 Colo. Republican, 518 U.S. at 610 (mentioning the past decisions which
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soft money ban should be classified as a contribution limitation,
it will not be analyzed under the same principles used by the
Court in Colorado Republican.174 Therefore any reliance on this
decision is misplaced.175
The soft money ban is clearly consistent with the principles
enunciated in Buckley.176 Although it does place limitations on
First Amendment rights, those limitations are minor and not
unduly restrictive.177 The governmental interest of the avoidance
of corruption is clear, and the ban on soft money is narrowly
tailored to prevent the continuance of corruption in our political
process. 178
found contribution limits acceptable, while expenditure limitations have been often
invalidated). See generally Cal. Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 193 (1981)
(citing Buckley and also clarifying the distinct natures of expenditure and
contribution limitations); Buckley, 423 U.S. at 23 (noting the differences between
the limitations on expenditures and contributions).
174 See Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1287 (arguing that Colorado Republican only
applies to expenditure analysis and the rationale is inapplicable to the soft money
ban); see also House Freshmen Introduce Campaign Finance Reform Bill, WHITE
HOUSE BULL., July 17, 1997 (quoting Senator Mitchell's concern that the soft money
ban would greatly restrict a candidate's ability to raise money); Craig Gilbert,
Campaign Reform Takes a Pounding; Lawyers Toss Book at McCain-Feingold,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2002, at 01A (categorizing soft money as those
contributions by unions, corporation, and individuals to political parties).
175 See Colo. Republican, 518 U.S. at 610 (mentioning the past decisions which
found contribution limits acceptable, while expenditure limitations have been often
invalidated); Yarmish, supra note 8, at 1287 (stating that Colorado Republican
rationale is irrelevant); Eldridge, supra note 160 (contending that the Colorado
Republican Case dealt with expenditure limitations, and the case only mentioned
the soft money issue in dicta).
176 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6 (addressing issues of contributions by
individuals, the soft money issue); Waxman, supra note 116 (remarking that soft
money ban is consistent with current case law). See generally Hasen, supra note 168
(stating that the Buckley decision is contended by the same dissenting minority in
the Supreme Court).
177 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 122 (mentioning law does not prohibit
expenditures but only contributions leaving other avenues of participation open).
See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 1,1 (2001) (explaining that some
restriction on speech does not necessarily result in the unconstitutionality of a
statute); Richards, supra note 1, at 559-60 (2001) (noting that Buckley upheld
contribution limits on the grounds that they imposed only marginal restriction on
speech).
178 See Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 96, at 601 (noting that soft money
is often donated by large corporations and associations that have interests in
legislative changes). See generally FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001) (positing then that if Congress has discerned that a
complete ban is appropriate, than the decision should be given deference); Yarmish,
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B. Advocacy Limitations Issue
The new definition of independent expenditure, which
proposed a limitation on those expenditures that are truly
independent of a candidate, faces a much greater constitutional
challenge.179 Since this provision deals with the way groups
spend their money, it must be evaluated under the expenditure
limitation analysis.180 Although the same compelling interest
test applies, the expenditure limitations are subject to a higher
level of scrutiny due to the allegedly "more severe restrictions on
protected freedoms of political expression and association."181 In
assessing the constitutionality of expenditure provisions,
Buckley proceeded to define express advocacy as an
advertisement "that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identifiable candidate for federal office" which
included the words "vote for" or "defeat," or other words of such
nature.18 2 The definition in the Act expands express advocacy to
include previously unregulated communications.183 Despite the
expansion however, the Act can still be found constitutional
within the Buckley framework.184
supra note 8, at 1283-84 (noting also that since soft money is typically donated in
very large amounts).
179 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 121 (observing that both supporters and
challengers of the Act recognize the susceptibility of this provision); Editorial,
McCain-Feingold Goes to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at A18 (mentioning the
arguments against limitations on issue advocacy).
180 See Buckley 424 U.S. at 23 (finding that expenditure limitations infringed
upon core First Amendment Rights and analyzing that provision separately from
contribution limitations); see also Feichtner, supra note 55, at 795 (mentioning since
Buckley decision courts have consistently classified regulation as either contribution
or expenditure limitation); Wheeler, supra note 55, at 683 (noting contribution
limits have been regularly upheld while expenditure limits are questionable).
181 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 (holding expenditure limitations pose much
greater burden on First Amendment rights).
182 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44; see FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
249 (1986) (finding Buckley language necessary for express advocacy); Citizens for
Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Buckley); Nat'l Right to Life PAC v. Lamb, 202 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 n.1
(W.D. Mo. 2002) (reiterating Buckley express advocacy definition).
183 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 121-22 (mentioning definition of issue
advocacy has been expanded); see also Bopp & Coleson, supra note 49, at 798-99
(clarifying the means by which the provisions narrow of traditional notions of issue
advocacy); Richards, supra note 23, at 119-20 (indicating that the term
'electioneering communications' in BCRA is an expansion on the express advocacy
standard elucidated by the Court).
184 See Montiero, supra note 183, at 121-22 (arguing that under the recently
enunciated principles new issue advocacy definition can be found constitutional); see
20031
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Challengers have argued that the provision violates the
right to freedom of expression.185 This argument is misplaced,
however, and the provision in question does not violate
expressive rights.186 The provision instead refuses to allow
advertisements, cloaked in the label of an issue ad, to influence
federal elections.187 Congress has the authority to regulate
campaign advertisements in order to prevent corruption in
federal elections.188 Although under the Act advertisements can
still be bought in abundance, those advertisements must now be
also F. Cordes Ford, IV, Note, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee and Implications for the Future of Campaign Finance
Reform, 54 S.C. L. REV. 181, 194 (2002) (indicating the parallels between Colorado
II and the language of the BCRA supporting a finding of its constitutionality);
Karen Griffin Kaldahl, A Short History of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2001, 71 MIss. L.J. 275, 298 (2001) (providing possible rationale for the
constitutionality of the provision). But see Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, §201, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (providing an alternative definition of
'electioneering communications' in the event that the definition is found
unconstitutional; Bopp & Coleson, supra note 49, at 799-00 (providing support for
the provisions unconstitutionality); Richards, supra note 23, at 120-21 (indicating
that the drafters of BCRA had doubts about the constitutionality of this definition).
185 See 148 CONG. REC. S2096,2096 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Hutchinson) (arguing 'The bill tramples the principle of freedom of speech by
restricting broadcast advertising for 60 days before an election"); see also Walsh,
supra note 107, at A01 (indicating the plaintiffs attack was founded upon a
violation of First Amendment rights); Jeff Zeleny & Jill Zuckman, Campaign Law
Heads To Next Battlefield; Bush Signs Bill, Goes Fundraising, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28,
2002, at 1 (noting NRA will challenge the limitation on advertisements).
186 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,438 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Shays) (stating that Act does nothing to limit political participation but is aimed at
giving all a more equal chance in participation); see also Kaldahl, supra note 184, at
298 (elucidating the rebuttal to the constitutional arguments against the provisions
purported limiting the freedom of expression); Wassom, supra note 123, at 1798-99
(explaining the rationale for the constitutionality of the provisions open to the
freedom of expression attack).
187 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Lucas) (mentioning that campaign finance reform will eliminate the problematic
political advertisements present in the political arena); see also Kaldahl, supra note
184, at 298 (providing this rationale to support the constitutionality of the
provision); Wassom, supra note 123, at 1800 (indicating that the provision should be
upheld as constitutional because the limitation on the freedom of expression are
subordinated to legitimate concerns for the protection of the political process).
188 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo.. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-94 & 400-01 (2000)
(indicating the majority's and concurrences' acceptance of this as a legitimate
governmental interest against which freedom of expression must be weighed); see
also Richards, supra note 23, at 102-03 (asserting the protection of the political
process as a legitimate interest); McCain-Feingold Goes to Court, supra note 179
(arguing that there is a difference between issue advocacy and sham campaign ads
which sanctions Congressional regulation of the latter).
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paid for with hard money subject to FECA limitations.189
Many of the same arguments that opponents will propose
against the soft money ban will seemingly be utilized in the
challenge to the independent expenditure definition.
Challengers argue that because issue advocacy advertisements
allow groups to enhance public discussion on topics of concern to
the American people, any restriction on the ads violates the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee. 190  The independent
expenditure definition, however, does not limit the free speech of
groups because it only encompasses diluted speech that serves
no purpose in enhancing the political debate.191 The sham ads
are political attacks on candidates meant to incite the voters and
do not advocate any actual issue.192 Such ads are not actually
used to improve political discourse on any issue.193 The law does
not intrude upon the rights of anyone to run a legitimate
advertisement on an important issue.194 Associational rights are
189 See 148 CONG. REC. H369,374 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Keller) (stating that all ads 60 days before an election must be paid for with hard
money); see also Richards, supra note 23, at 116-17 (indicating that there is no limit
on speech per se, just a limitation on its funding to protect the political process);
McCain-Feingold Goes to Court, supra note 179 (mentioning the new limits will
subject advertisements to more extensive regulation).
190 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 49, at 787-88 (articulating the arguments
that unfettered expression is an integral component of the political process); Jowers,
supra note 84, at 86 (arguing that issue advocacy ads contribute to official's
accountability, thereby enhancing public debate and any restrictions violate free
speech); Peter J. Cammarano, III, Note, Colorado Cases and Costly Campaigns: An
Invitation to Reform, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 499, 500 n.9 (providing a historical
account of this contention).
191 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (indicating that the restrictions
may actually improve political debate); see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly
Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue
Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 265 (2000) (indicating the ease of cloaking its
political convictions in terms of a political issue); Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra note 91,
at 95 (arguing the "magic words test" allows candidates to run ads promoting
themselves shrouded in an issue ad).
192 See Hasen, supra note 191, at 265 (characterizing a sham advertisement as
cloaking its political convictions in terms of a political issue); see also Potter &
Jowers, supra note 7, at 857 (remarking that President Clinton in 1995 directed the
DNC to run issue ads about his achievements in office to bolster his approval before
the election of 1996); Montiero, supra note 3, at 122 (indicating that the issue ads
were essential shams to avoid the constraints of FECA).
193 See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that ads
which do not disclose the source of the ad can harm political institutions); see also
Cain, supra note 143, at 71 (indicating according to one study that only one in five
advocated the sponsor's position); Hasen, supra note 78, at 1776 (indicating that
issue ads rarely incite political debate but usually support a candidate).
194 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395-96 (2000) (providing
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not infringed upon because these issue advocacy ads often do not
disclose the true source of funding and support, or they name a
general, non-identifiable group.195
The constitutionality of the provision depends on the Court's
acceptance of the rationale placed forth in FEC v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee.196 In upholding
limitations on party coordinate expenditures, the Court reasoned
this restriction was necessary in order to prevent circumvention
of the established campaign finance laws.197 The same logic
should be applied in this situation: in order to prevent evasive
advertisements, the Court should uphold the definition of
independent expenditures.198 Corporations and labor unions are
prohibited from making a contribution or expenditure to
influence federal elections.199 The Court should recognize these
that restrictions on sham advertising does not restrict legitimate advertising);
Buckley, 524 U.S. at 21 (indicating that the financing limitations are not proven to
have a limiting effect on political debate); see also David S. Broder, Failed Reform,
Fading Parties; Supreme Court Won't Uphold Campaign Finance Law, PLAIN
DEALER, Apr. 24, 2002, at B9 (stating the law requires that advertisements within
the statute's period must be funded by money subject to contribution limitations).
195 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,270 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Lucas) (noting that the source of advertisements is often indiscernible and no one
can be held accountable for such advertisements); see also Richard Briffault, supra
note 95, at 1751-52 (providing that because the advertisements are classified as
issue advertisements they do not require the disclosure of the source of funding);
Hasen, supra note 78, at 1776-77 (indicating that disclosure of the source of funding
is not required in sham advertising).
196 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (holding that a limit on party coordinate expenditures
is constitutional in order to avoid evading campaign finance laws).
197 Id. (remarking that to permit unlimited party coordinate expenditures
would undermined the current campaign finance laws); see also Kyla D. Cummings,
Election Law, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 967, 967 (2002) (explaining the
Court as attempting to minimize the circumvention of contribution limitations);
Richards, supra note 23, at 122-23 (quoting the courts concerns about the
circumvention of campaign limitations).
198 See Monteiro, supra note 3, at 122 (arguing the Court should adopt same
line of reasoning as applied to Colorado); see also Robert M. Knop, Note, The Party
Expenditure Provision's Near Death Experience: Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC, 47 AM. U.L. REV 963, 988 (1998) (indicating the
analogous treatment that should be given to both categories). But see Richards,
supra note 23, at 92-94 (indicating that the court did not use an analogous analysis
for restraints on expenditures in Buckley).
199 See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (prohibiting union or corporate donations); see also
Overman, supra note 56, at 1268 (providing this prohibitions as one of the keys to
the legislation); Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 272, 281
n.90 (2002) (indicating the prohibition of corporate and labor union funding of issue
ads).
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ads for what they really accomplish, avoiding longstanding
federal law, and impose the limitations of the Act.
Although the arguments in support of the independent
expenditure definition are not as strong as the soft money
arguments, it can still pass constitutional muster if the Court
considers the true nature and effect of the ads instead of the
fagade of issue advocacy.200 This limitation is necessary in order
to protect the electoral system and renew the faith of American
citizens in political campaigns.201
IV. CONTINUING VIABILITY OF BUCKLEY V. VALEO
Recently, established campaign finance jurisprudence has
been questioned. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC,202 the Supreme Court hinted towards a doctrinal shift.203
Although the majority upheld the Buckley principles, the case
generated five opinions.204 Four Justices stated their outright
disapproval of the doctrine.205 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
200 See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610
(1996) (stating that the Court has generally found limitations on contributions and
expenditures constitutional); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986) (stating "It has, in any event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribution
limits would more readily clear hurdles before them."); see also Monteiro, supra note
3, at 122 (arguing the Court should adopt same line of reasoning as applied to
Colorado).
201 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (stating that
the renewal of the faith in the political process is important given its significance in
the democratic system); see also Bonifaz et al., supra note 72, at 48 (quoting poll
figures that show Americans believe campaign contributions sway the decision
making process of elected officials); Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra note 91, at 92 (noting
American discontent with the current political system).
202 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
203 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397 (arguing that although the dissent would like to
see Buckley overruled, the majority responded "[t]he answer is that we are supposed
to decide this case. Shrink and Fredman did not request that Buckley be
overruled"); see also Bauer, supra note 3, at 759 (arguing the Supreme Court is
conscious of problems with the campaign finance doctrine and suggestions have
been put forth to change that doctrine); Ethan Fenn, An Economic View of
Campaign Finance Spending Under the First Amendment, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 173, 174 (2001) (arguing a majority of Justices showed a tendency to
overrule Buckley in the Nixon case).
204 See Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (displaying the split in opinion beteen the
court on the issue of campaign finance reform); see also Martens, supra note 80, at
824 n.38 (noting that five separate opinions were issued from the Court in this
case); Richards, supra note 1, at 586 (indicating the heavy diversity within the
Court's decision).
205 Justice Stevens argued that money is not speech and therefore is not
entitled to as much protection as integral First Amendment Rights. Nixon, 528 U.S.
20031
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joined in the decision upholding Buckley, but under the rationale
that Buckley would allow the government to pass regulations
that curb the spending soft money. 206 The decision has been
hailed as a possible precursor to a doctrinal shift in campaign
finance legislation.207
The Buckley distinction has not effectively protected First
Amendment rights and should be reviewed by the Court. The
argument that expenditures are not subject to quid pro quo
arrangements 208 is no longer true in today's system of politics.209
The Buckley decision was announced in a different political
at 398-99. Justice Thomas's opinion, in which Justice Scalia concurred, argued that
Buckley does not work and ignores core First Amendment principles. Id. at 411-18.
They both argue that strict scrutiny should be used in order to give speech the
protection it deserves. Id. at 410. Finally, Justice Kennedy argued that Buckley
should be overruled and allow Congress to attempt new regulations that coincide
with First Amendment Principles. Id. at 410-11.
206 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 404 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the need for
flexibility in this area is great and that Congress should be given much deference in
this area); Richards, supra note 1, at 589-90 (positing Breyer and Ginsburg
"suggested Buckley either was flexible enough to permit needed reforms, or in the
alternative, could be reinterpreted..."); see also Overman, supra note 56, at 1245
(suggesting efforts to curb the corruptive influence of soft money was behind the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
207 See Levin, supra note 81, at 176 (explaining many mistakenly believed the
Court would use Nixon to limit Buckley and strike down Missouri's contribution
limit); Richards, supra note 1, at 587 (noting that if the Court had been asked to
overrule Buckley, there may have been a different result); Richards, supra note 23,
at 116 (suggesting "Colorado 11 reduced the First Amendment obstacles faced by the
soft money restrictions in the recently enacted Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002").
208 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976) (finding reduced possibility
of corruption in expenditures as compared to large campaign contributions); Jodi
Miller, Affirmative Action: "Democracy in Free Fall" The Use of Callot Initiatives to
Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1,
28 (1999) (suggesting corporate contributions to campaigns creates a greater
possibility of corruption due to the potential quid pro quo influence on the
candidate); see also Conrad, supra note 138, at 569 (discussing the government
interest in preventing actual quid pro quo corruption and potential influence of
elected officials).
209 See Martens, supra note 80, at 843-44 (stating that campaign finance laws
have not adequately protected from corruption in the electoral system); Richards,
supra note 1, at 596 (positing "now may be the time for the Court to return to the
drawing board and rethink its approach to the role of money in politics"). See
generally Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of
International Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 793, 808 (2001) (explaining "[t]he classic example of corruption is a
payment involving a quid pro quo between the offeror and public official in which
each party acts with the intent that the transfer influence the exercise of
governmental authority").
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atmosphere.210 Today political parties and other organizations
such as PACS, citizens groups and political associations play a
role unimaginable by the Buckley Court.211
Buckley established that the only government interest
compelling enough to impinge on First Amendment rights was
the corruption or appearance of corruption.212 Quid pro quo
arrangements seem to be the only adequate justification for
campaign finance legislation.213 This limited view has hampered
the passage and validity of campaign finance reform. In reality,
there are many other grave problems that are in need of
correction in our current campaign system. The Court should
consider the many purposes advanced in the aggregate and
uphold campaign finance legislation.
In addition to concerns over corruption or the appearance of
corruption, the amount of money necessary to mount a
210 See Sorauf, supra note 9, at 1366 (arguing the system the FECA intended
to regulate has changed dramatically); Richards, supra note 23, at 88 (stating "[t]he
amount of soft money contributed in each federal election has grown at an alarming
rate, from $ 19 million in 1980 to at least $ 410 million during the 2000 presidential
elections"); see also Brent A. Fewell, Comment, Awash in Soft Money and Political
Corruption: The Need for Campaign Finance Reform, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 107, 134
(1997) (suggesting "campaign finance reform must focus on preventing and exposing
the most egregious and blatant forms of corruption by making quid pro quo risky and
difficult for both candidate and donor").
211 See Briffault, supra note 69, at 627 (arguing that issue advocacy, party
expenditures and soft money are recent developments not considered in Buckley);
see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Selling Cost Containment,
19 AM. J. L. AND MED. 95, 104 (1993) (noting PAC contributions increased ninety
percent between 1980 and the first half of 1991). But see Nelson, supra note 77, at
524 (suggesting "[s]ince Buckley v. Valeo permits . . . demand-side reforms, a
continuation of the Buckley regime still allows enough flexibility to implement a
comprehensive reform strategy").
212 See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1984) (stating "[wie held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control
that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances"); Bauer, supra note 3, at 745 (arguing that most accept the premises that
corruption or the appearance of corruption is necessary for governmental
restrictions on campaign finances); Potter, supra note 10, at 151 (remarking that
corruption or appearance thereof satisfied the Court's analysis).
213 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29 (accepting rationale that corruption is a
sufficient justification for regulation); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 914
(6th Cir. 1998) (finding "[t]he Buckley court rejected two other governmental
interests advanced by Congress as justification for spending caps"); see also John C.
Eastman, Strictly Scrutinizing Campaign Finance Restrictions (and the Courts that
Judge Them), 50 CATH. U.L. REV. 13, 14 (2000) (noting "the Supreme Court applies
a slightly lower level of scrutiny when assessing restrictions on contributions to
candidates than it applies when assessing restrictions on expenditures").
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formidable challenge for political office has been steadily
increasing.214 In 1976, the year Buckley was decided, the average
cost of a successful House race was at $87,200, and by 1996 it
had increased to $661,000.215 The amount of money spent in
Senate elections is even more absurd. In 1976 the average
Senate candidate spent $609,100, which increased to $3.6 million
by 1996.216 According to a Federal Election Commission Report,
the aggregate spent by Congressional candidates in the 2000
elections reached $1.006 billion, the highest figure ever
recorded.217 Along with discouraging potentially qualified
citizens from running, this also keeps candidates constantly
focused on fundraising for the next election.218 For a member of
214 See Eric J. Felsberg, Note, Creating a Beck Statute: Recent Congressional
Attempts and a Proposal for the Future, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 247, 247
(noting the 1996 Presidential campaigns cost hundreds of millions of dollars);
Farrah Nawaz, Note, Campaign Finance Reform "Dollars for Votes" - The Amercian
Democracy, 14 ST. JOHN'S J.L. CoMM. 155, 168 (1999) (recognizing "[sipending in
Senate races has increased from a total of $ 38.1 million in the 1976 cycle, to $ 210.8
million in the 1992 elections"); see also Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justices in State
Courts: The Ballot Box or the Back Room?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1206-07 (2000)
(suggesting "[njonpartisan elections are becoming increasingly expensive and involve
many of the same problems with campaign contributions as partisan elections").
215 See Nawaz, supra note 214, at 168 (explaining "spending in House races has
increased from $ 60.9 million in 1976, to $ 326.9 million in 1992); Schneider, supra
note 70, at 629 n.8 (noting the large increase for campaign spending in the last
twenty years); see also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 91, at 1132 (stressing large
increase in candidate spending in the House from 1976 to 1992).
216 See Schneider, supra note 70, at 629 n.8; see also Blasi, supra note 19, at
1282 (explaining as of 1992, Senators must raise nearly $13,000 each week in office
to generate enough funds to cover average winning campaign costs); Joseph E.
Finley, Comment, The Pitfalls of Contigent Public Financing in Congressional
Campaign Spending Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 735, 735-36 (1995) (noting
"[s]kyrocketing campaign costs have fueled the need for congressional campaign
finance reform. By 1992, spending in congressional elections had reached $ 678
million, an increase of more than 300% since 1978").
217 Federal Election Committee, supra note 2; see also John Bonifaz et at.,
supra note 72, at 39 (stating the 1996 presidential and congressional candidates
spent over two billion dollars); Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2470, 2470 (1997) (noting $866 million was spent in 1996 by candidates for
staffing, polls, advertisements and travel).
218 See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 144 (arguing candidates devote an
increasing amount of time to fundraising because of increasing costs); David A.
Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
141, 155-56 (1995) (observing "demands of fund-raising are also said to hurt the
public by diverting the time and energy officials need to do their jobs well and,
partly as a result, by driving many able people from public service"); see also Banks
& Green, supra note 10, at 3 (suggesting the view that unlimited spending is a
serious problem is widely held).
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the House of Representatives, especially, the pressure to amass
an effective war chest never ends.219
This reality keeps our elected officials from properly serving
the needs of their constituents. In devoting a substantial
amount of time towards amassing re-election funds, officials are
distracted from the needs of their constituents and cannot
effectively formulate policies, sponsor legislation, or even discuss
issues.220 This political truth serves to further alienate the
average American from the political process. Not only do they
lack the money to buy influence, but also their elected official
does not have time to hear their concerns because of the
preoccupation with fundraising.221 The need for effective political
representation should also be a compelling governmental
justification for regulation of campaign finance.222
219 See Blasi, supra note 19, at 1282 (noting that the two year term for
representatives keeps them in constant pursuit of campaign funds); Grant Davis-
Denny, Comment, Coercion in Campaign Finance Reform: A Closer Look at Footnote
65 of Buckley v. Valeo, 50 UCLA L. REV. 205, 209 (2002) (recognizing "[b]ecause
they must run for reelection every two years, members of the U.S. House of
Representatives must engage in constant fundraising to keep their campaign war
chests full"). See generally Jezer et al., supra note 52, at 339 (discussing the large
amounts of money spent by incumbents in elections).
220 See Blasi, supra note 19, at 1282 (stating that constant fund raising
prevents politicians from effectively performing their job functions); Peterson, supra
note 53, at 434 (1998) (noting the issue of preserving representatives' time for
representing, not fund raising has been argued before a state court); see also
Douglas C. Melcher, Note, Free Air Time for Political Advertising: An Invasion of the
Protected First Amendment Freedoms of Broadcasters, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100,
120 (1998) (suggesting the government could establish a national campaign fund for
congressional elections similar to reduce fund raising pressures).
221 See Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra note 91, at 92 (arguing "[f]ully two-thirds of
the public think that their own representatives in Congress would listen to the
views of outsiders who made large political contributions before a constituent's
view"); Andrea D. Williams, Comment, The Lowest Unit Charge Provision of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, and its Role in Maintaining a
Democratic Electoral Process, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 265, 300 (1993) (suggesting
discussion of political issues has become secondary to fundraising); see also David L.
Boren, A Recipe for the Reform of Congress, 21 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 7 (1996)
(arguing "current campaign law encourages practices that actually squelch political
discourse").
222 See Potter, supra note 10, at 172 (explaining "[c]ampaign limits are not
intended to infringe on political speech but rather intend to give control back to the
common voter and allow democracy to function as originally intended."); see also
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link Between Student Activity Fees and Campaign
Finance Regulations, 33 IND. L. REV. 435, 471 (2000) (suggesting "promoting
diversity particularly supports campaign finance regulation because of the self-
government rationale that underpins the free speech clause"); Rebecca Tushnet,
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common With
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When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act is considered by
the Supreme Court, the Court should abandon the strict Buckley
framework and consider the legislation in light of current
societal needs.223 The alternative government interest of effective
representation should be considered along with corruption or
appearance of corruption.224 Although the First Amendment
remains a dominating factor to consider, the changes made will
only increase the exchange of valuable and constructive ideas in
our political campaigns.225
V. CONCLUSION
Recently in McConnell v. FEC,226 a lengthy decision which
produced three separate opinions, a three-judge panel upheld
portions of the Act, but invalidated other provisions.227 The
Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2000) (supporting Justice Breyer's view that
campaign finance regulation is justified in order to keep the few from drowning out
the many).
223 See Kolb & Dreibelbis, supra note 91, at 93 (arguing increasing campaign
costs have left American people with fewer candidates to choose from); see also
Potter & Jowers, supra note 7, at 839 (observing "the Supreme Court is not likely to
invalidate key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002"). See
generally Richards, supra note 23, at 116 (explaining "the legislation prevents
federal candidates and the national parties from raising and spending soft money").
224 See Schneider, supra note 70, at 661 (proposing other compelling interests
that should be considered in addition to corruption or the appearance thereof); Jon
L. Mills, The Future of Governmental Ethics: Law and Morality, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L.
405, 414 (1999) (recognizing "[o]thers contend that the goal of campaign finance
reform is to insure that every candidate has the same opportunity to participate in
the electoral process"). But see Potter & Jowers, supra note 223, at 874 (arguing the
Act should be upheld based on present compelling government interests of prevent
the appearance of, as well as actual, corruption).
225 See Simon, supra note 2, at 174 (arguing campaign finance laws are
constitutional and the current scheme hampers political participation). See
generally Samuel M. Walker, Note, Campaign Finance Reform in the 105th
Congress: The Failure to Address Self-Financed Candidates, 27 HOFsTRA L. REV.
181, 213 (1998) (discussing the struggle between the First Amendment and efforts
to regulate soft money contributions). But see Gora, supra note 24, at 26 (1999)
(positing "[i]f there is any lesson we should have learned from 25 years of campaign
finance controls, it is that limits on campaign funding, apart from constitutional
questions, have an equally critical flaw: they just do not work").
226 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7834 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
227 McConnell v. FEC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7816, *20 (D.C. Cir 2003)
(providing a chart of the court's ruling); see Editorial, An Urgent Task for the Court,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A30 (noting the court's decision invalidated portions of
the law); see also Adam Clymer, Campaign Finance Muddle Recalls Election of '76,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A28 (arguing that the decision has caused confusion
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decision upheld the ban on federal candidates and officeholders
from raising soft money, 228 and the provision which prohibits
national and state parties from using soft money to affect
electoral outcomes. 229 However, it invalidated the provision
which banned national and state parties from raising and
spending soft money for non-federal activities or for activities
that do not directly influence federal elections.230 The decision
left many in a state of confusion, wondering what fund raising
activities are acceptable.231 A stay was therefore issued, allowing
the law to stand.232 The Supreme Court is expected to hear the
case this fall,233 and should recognize that banning all soft money
over what raising and spending activities are permitted).
228 See McConnell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7816 at *20 (noting the court's
holding); see also Jim VandeHei, Democrats Initiate New 'Soft Money' Campaign,
WASH. POST, May 7, 2003, at A01 (remarking federal officeholders may not raise
soft money under the recent decision); Jules Witcover, Sorting Through Campaign
Finance Confusion, BALT. SUN, May 9, 2003, at 25A (reiterating the holding of the
panel).
229 See McConnell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7816 at *20 (describing holding of
the court); Neely Tucker and Edward Walsh, Panel Stays Campaign Finance
Ruling, WASH. POST, May 20, 2003, at Al (stating certain provisions were upheld by
the panel's decision); see also Editorial, Soft Money Ban Survives, Barely, S. F.
CHRON., May 7, 2003, at A22 (repeating the holding of the court).
230 See McConnell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7816 at *20 (noting the panel's
decision); see also James Polti, Senators Try to Stay 'Soft Money' Ruling, FIN. TIMES,
May 9, 2003, at 7 (pronouncing McCain's unhappiness with the ruling, as an
upheaval of the law could come during the presidential campaign); Lawmakers Plan
Push for Suspension of Campaign Fund Ruling, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2003, at C24
(mentioning Senator McCain's discontent over the district court ruling).
231 See Clymer, supra note 227 (noting questions have arisen as to who is
permitted to raise soft money); Richard Oppel, Court Stays Its Ruling on Financing
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at A21 (stating politicians were left confused
over what constituted permissible fund-raising activity); Witcover, supra note 228
(remarking the law was "clouded by a ruling that figuratively gives to the reformers
with one hand and takes away with the other).
232 See Nick Anderson, Ban on 'Soft Money' Stands, L. A. TIMES, May 20, 2003,
at 14 (describing the federal court decision which mandates compliance with the soft
money ban); Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Rule on Schedule of Campaign Finance
Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003 (noting "[tihe district court issued a stay of the
decision, so the law remains in effect until the Supreme Court rules"); Deborah
McGregor, Supreme Court to Decide on 'Soft Money' Donations, FIN. TIMES, May 20,
2003, at 2 (asserting federal court order suspended its previous decision).
233 See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court Backs Campaign Gift Limits Ruling
Also Affects Non-Profits' Donations, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2003, at A3
(remarking the Supreme Court is to hear the case in the fall); Thomas Edsall,
Nonprofits Bound By Donation Rules; McCain-Feingold Case Impact Seen, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2003, at A6 (noting the court will hear campaign finance case this
fall); see also Oppel, supra note 231 (commenting the Court is expected before the
2004 presidential election).
2003]
270 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:1
is the only effective solution to insure compliance with campaign
finance laws.
The Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002 attempts to make
meaningful changes to the current system of campaign finance.
By banning the use of soft money and limiting the airing of issue
advocacy advertisements close to Election Day, Congress is
attempting to give meaning to the existing provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act.234 Administrative and judicial
loopholes have created a system that is spinning out of control.235
The Supreme Court should recognize the current state of
political campaigns and uphold the legislation. Although it does
not require an abandonment of Buckley principles, the Court
should seriously consider abandoning the old doctrine and
formulating a new, more workable doctrine that considers both
the commands of the First Amendment and the needs of the
American citizens at large.
234 See 148 CONG. REC. S2096,2098 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (stating the soft money ban is a step in the right direction towards
meaningful reform); see also Briffault, supra note 69, at 620 (noting "[t]hrough the
development of soft money, the parties have enabled donors to avoid FECA's
contribution caps, its ban on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in
federal elections, and its limitation on spending by presidential candidates who
choose to accept public funding"); Scott D. Slater, Comment, Where the Bucks Stop:
An Analysis of Presidential Telephone Solicitations Under 18 U.S.C. § 607, 59 U.
PITT. L. REV. 851, 878 (1998) (explaining one limitation of FECA was the existence
of a soft money loophole which enabled politicians to circumvent the Act).
235 See 148 CONG. REC. H270,272 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Turner) (stating large donations of soft money have undermined the confidence of
American people); see also Henning, supra note 209, at 843 (recognizing "[t]he
system of campaign contribution regulation in the United States is complex ... and
riddled with loopholes"). But see Bonifaz et al., supra note 72, at 51 (arguing "the
courts cannot in good faith conclude that the corrupting failures of the present
system are attributable to soft money alone and thereby ignore the corrosive effects
of bundled contributions").
